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Abstract 
This document investigates the potential for SHAFA to enter the Canadian 
supportive housing industry, focusing on the lower mainland of British Columbia. 
It outlines the competitors in the marketplace, SHAFA’s core competencies, and 
provides an industry overview using Porter’s Five Forces of Competition 
Framework. Demographics indicate that there are currently opportunities for new 
entrants in the market, primarily due to high demand from the aging baby boom 
generation, however differentiating SHAFA from the current competitors and 
choosing an appropriate entry structure and remain challenges. This analysis 
recommends that if SHAFA chooses to enter the supportive housing industry it 
should do so in a joint venture partnership with an established company as this 
would provide SHAFA access to industry experience as well as insulate SHAFA 
from financial and other risks to some degree. A preliminary financial estimate is 
included to illustrate SHAFA’s financial responsibilities should it choose to follow 
this entry method. 
 
Keywords: supportive housing, independent living, market entry 
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Executive Summary 
The goal of this document is to provide sufficient information on the 
supportive housing industry in Canada, with a particular focus on British 
Columbia, to enable SHAFA to make an informed decision about entering the 
market. Current demographic trends indicate that there are currently 
opportunities for new entrants in the market due to the retirement and 
senescence of the baby boom generation. A competitor analysis indicates that 
there is very little differentiation between the competitors currently in the 
marketplace, indicating that there is opportunity for SHAFA to gain a competitive 
advantage by intelligently marketing its key success factor of its expertise with 
and access to advanced biomedical engineering technology. An analysis of the 
entry modes available to SHAFA indicates that the optimal entry mode for 
SHAFA appears to be in a joint venture partnership with an established 
company, possibly in the construction industry. This would allow SHAFA to 
benefit from their expertise during the construction of the supportive housing 
facility as well as insulate SHAFA from some of the financial and other risks 
associated with being a new entrant into an industry. Finally, this paper provides 
preliminary financial estimates for SHAFA’s first few years of operation in order to 
provide SHAFA with an idea of the financial responsibilities it will be exposed to 
when operating within the supportive housing industry. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Objectives of the Business Plan 
The objective of this project is to serve as a professional business plan for 
SHAFA, a start up company looking to enter the independent living segment of 
the supportive housing industry. This project will examine the main problems and 
issues in the supportive housing industry, such as an overall lack of supportive 
housing and a lack of technological innovation in existing units. A detailed 
analysis of the demographic forces affecting the supportive housing industry as 
well as an analysis of current competitors operating within the industry and their 
product offerings will support these conclusions. This analysis will provide 
SHAFA with an overview of the market forces currently influencing the supportive 
housing industry. The project then examines SHAFA’s solution to the problem, 
which is to provide housing equipped with technology allowing seniors to 
maintain their independence. An analysis of SHAFA’s key success factors and 
areas of differentiation between SHAFA and its competitors will support this. This 
analysis will provide SHAFA with viable product, marketing, and operating 
strategies, which will enable SHAFA to successfully enter and operate within the 
industry. Finally, this project provides an analysis of the projected financial 
outlays that SHAFA will assume in order to construct and operate an 
independent living facility in the supportive housing industry and strategies to 
mitigate and minimize the associated risks and costs. 
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1.2. SHAFA’s Business Opportunity 
Currently, the major problem facing the supportive housing industry in 
Canada is a lack of supply driven by increasing demand from the aging 
population. “Baby boomers”, the colloquial term for individuals born during the 
two decades following the end of World War II, a period characterized by a 
dramatically increased birth rate termed the “baby boom”, are reaching their 
golden years and beginning to retire from the Canadian work force. Baby 
boomers constitute the largest proportion of the Canadian population. In 2011, 
Statistics Canada reported that approximately 9.6 million Canadians were baby 
boomers, representing nearly 30% of Canada’s total population (Statistics 
Canada, 2011). This rapid demographic shift from employees to retirees will have 
a number of deleterious effects on Canada’s economy and social welfare system. 
Chief among them is an increasing reliance on supportive care as the baby 
boomers face the deleterious effects of the aging process on their bodies and 
their minds. Additionally, as everyday tasks become more difficult for baby 
boomers due to age related health problems, even more individuals disappear 
from Canada’s workforce on either a part time or a full time basis to serve as 
caregivers for the elderly. Simultaneously, there is an observed lack of 
technological innovation by the current providers within the supportive housing 
industry. This has resulted in situations where individuals who might be able to 
maintain their independence if provided with access to the proper technology 
instead are being placed in increasing levels of supportive care where they are 
forced to rely on others to provide for their needs. 
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SHAFA’s decision to enter the supportive housing market will help 
address the growing need for supportive housing facilities. SHAFA’s universal 
home concept is an attempt to provide individuals in supportive housing with the 
technology they need in order to maintain their independence as long as 
possible. The belief underlying the universal home concept is simple: by 
designing a home with an individual’s specific needs in mind, it is possible for 
that individual to remain independent for a longer period. Reducing an 
individual’s reliance on caregivers, either formally through a provincial health 
care institution or informally through family members or friends, by providing a 
home constructed to allow that specific individual to maintain their levels of self-
sufficiency will reduce that individual’s impact on the provincial health care 
system and ultimately benefit the Canadian taxpayer. Additionally, allowing 
individuals to maintain their independence makes the individual feel like less of a 
burden to their caregivers. This ultimately improves their outlook on life and 
provides value to the individual.  
In summary, as Canadians age the demand for supportive housing 
services will rapidly increase. The universal home concept as envisioned by 
SHAFA will allow individuals living in supportive housing to achieve increased 
independence, reduced reliance on publicly funded services, and an increased 
quality of life. By providing the technology and expertise necessary to deliver 
these benefits, SHAFA hopes to become an integral provider of the products and 
services necessary to meet the additional demand for supportive housing 
services and a key player in this growing industry. 
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2. Supportive Housing in Canada 
2.1. Market Segment Analysis 
There are three market segments in the Canadian supportive housing 
industry, separated by the functional abilities of the residents: Independent 
Living, Assisted Living and Long Term Care (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). 
The residents of each subsequent segment require an increasing level of care. 
The profile of the average resident is similar: around 80% female, approximately 
85 years old, requires assistance with around two activities of daily living, has 
children in the local community, and has foregone owning real estate for 
assistance or care, usually due to a life event (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 
2012). While the primary distinguishing factor between the three segments is the 
level of care provided, each segment possesses other unique characteristics. 
2.1.1. Independent Living Residences 
Catering to residents between 65 and 75, Independent Living residences 
consist of individual apartments with communal dining areas and other common 
areas, and offer assistance with activities of daily living such as meal plans, 
housekeeping, laundry services, social activities and transportation (Baybridge 
Seniors Housing, 2012). The average resident is in residence between two to 
four years, paying between $2000 and $3500 a month of which between 40% 
and 50% is net profit (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). 
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2.1.2. Assisted Living Residences 
Also consisting of individual apartments with communal dining and activity 
areas, Assisted Living residences cater to residents between 75 and 85 
(Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). Assisted Living residences offer medication 
management and assistance with daily personal hygiene activities in addition to 
the activities of daily living offered in Independent Living residences (Baybridge 
Seniors Housing, 2012). The average resident pays between $2500 and $6000 a 
month, of which between 30% and 40% is net profit (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 
2012). In general, the average resident’s stay in an Assisted Living facility is 
between 18 and 36 months before they either pass away or progress to the next 
level of care (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). 
2.1.3. Long Term Care Residences 
Long Term Care residences offer the highest levels of personal care. They 
are the equivalent of private hospitals, with private rooms and nursing staff on 
duty around the clock (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). The average resident 
is over 85 and pays between $3000 and $7000 a month for this extensive level of 
care, of which between 15% and 25% is net profit to the facility (Baybridge 
Seniors Housing, 2012). While many supportive housing residents never require 
the levels of personal care they provide, Long Term Care residences are the 
ultimate destination for residents that progress through the entire continuum of 
care. As a result, the average resident is in residence between 6 and 24 months 
before passing away (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). 
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2.1.4. Other Distinguishing Factors 
Predictably, as the level of care provided increases along the supportive 
housing continuum other factors also increase, including regulation, stability of 
returns, and barriers to entry (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). This increase 
in regulation is because supportive housing residents are generally one of the 
most vulnerable segments of the population and therefore governments have a 
responsibility to ensure that residents are indeed receiving adequate levels of 
care. The increase in the stability of returns is due to similar reasons as there are 
often government subsidies for patients in Assisted Living and Long Term Care 
in most provinces (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). The increase in barriers to 
entry is mostly because provincial governments often control the supply of 
licensed beds for Assisted Living and Long Term Care facilities (Baybridge 
Seniors Housing, 2012). The difficulty managing the increased levels of support 
services necessary to provide an increased level of care is another factor that 
can contribute to an increased barrier to entry. Conversely, the elasticity of 
demand decreases as level of care increases (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 
2012). This is because the increasing severity of medical conditions of residents 
in Assisted Living and Long Term Care facilities often precludes their ability to 
switch to a competitor (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). On the other hand, 
operators of Independent Living residences need to remain cognizant of their 
customer experience and value proposition as their residents exhibit an increase 
in price sensitivity (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). In summary, a prospective 
supportive housing resident’s ideal residence is one that provides the level of 
care and amenities they desire for the lowest price. 
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2.2. Demographic Factors Affecting the Industry 
2.2.1. Canada’s Aging Population 
As the graph below clearly shows, Canada’s population is aging rapidly. 
Canadians over age 65 represent the fastest growing segment of Canada’s 
population, increasing by 14.1% since 2006 (Statistics Canada, 2012). This is 
more than double Canada’s total growth rate of 5.9% (Statistics Canada, 2012). 
This increase represents approximately 610,000 individuals, placing Canada’s 
total population of seniors at 4,945,000 in 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2012). 
Current demographic trends indicate that seniors could constitute up to 25% of 
the population by 2036 and up to 28% by 2061, giving Canada a total population 
of up to 15 million seniors by 2061 (Statistics Canada, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Canadians over age 65 (Statistics Canada, 2007, 
2012). 
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Not only will the total number of seniors grow rapidly, but seniors will also 
grow much older. The population of seniors aged 80 and older is projected to 
reach nearly 40% of the total senior population by 2061, an increase of almost 
50% from the 28% of the total they represented in 2009 (Statistics Canada, 
2010). This rapid and unprecedented increase in the number and age of seniors 
in Canada represents a serious issue for provincial health care providers. Data 
from the OECD indicates that between 2010 and 2025, the amount of Canada’s 
GDP spent on aging related health and long-term care will increase by 1.9% 
(OECD, 2010). This small percentage represents a huge increase in the actual 
dollar amount spent annually on healthcare, approximately $30.9 billion in total 
(Statistics Canada, Table 380-0017) or $905 per Canadian (Statistics Canada, 
Table 051-0001). 
With “an estimated 70 per cent of people over the age of 65 [needing] 
some form of long-term care in their lives,” (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 
2012) the simultaneous increase in the number and the age of seniors in Canada 
will rapidly increase the demand for supportive housing in Canada in the 
relatively near future. With the aging related health and long-term care costs 
projected to increase by $905 annually per Canadian within the same period, 
accommodating this influx of seniors will stretch provincial health care budgets to 
their limit. One likely result of the combination of these two factors will be an 
increased demand for privately operated supportive housing residences, as 
seniors with sufficient financial means requiring residential care will avoid the 
increasingly underfunded publicly subsidized supportive housing residences. 
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2.2.2. Canadians with Age Related Impairment 
A 2010 study by Canada’s Chief Public Health Officer, Dr. David Butler-
Jones, reported that in 2005 most Canadian seniors considered themselves to be 
generally in good health based on their ability to perform normal daily activities 
(Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010). Indeed, 71% of seniors aged 65 to 74 
years and 50% of seniors aged 75 years and older reported having perfect 
functional health (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010). However, the study 
also reported that approximately 25% of seniors experience some difficulty with 
mobility or sensory awareness that impaired their ability to perform tasks that 
required hearing, seeing, communicating, walking, climbing stairs, bending over, 
learning or other related activities (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010). 
Impairment in these key areas can seriously affect an individual’s ability at 
performing activities of daily living such as personal care, household chores and 
meal preparation (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010). 
As the age of the average senior gradually increases a larger proportion of 
seniors will develop conditions that impair their mobility or sensory awareness 
and consequently impair their ability to perform activities of daily life. Seniors who 
require assistance performing activities of daily life either rely on their families or 
friends to provide assistance or, in situations where families or friends are either 
unable or unwilling to provide assistance, enter a supportive housing residence. 
As a result of the combination of these two factors demand for supportive 
housing residences will rapidly increase in the near future as more seniors 
become unable to perform activities of daily life due to age related impairment. 
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2.2.3. Accidents due to Falls 
Carrying out activities of daily life with compromised mobility or sensory 
awareness increases the possibility of sustaining an accident in the home, 
including the most common cause of injury among seniors in Canada: a fall. Falls 
are very dangerous for seniors and occur most frequently in the home (Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2010). One third of all seniors are likely to experience 
a fall in a given year with seniors living alone or confined to their home at the 
greatest risk for experiencing a fall (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010). It is 
believed that this increased risk is due to seniors without sufficient social support 
networks possibly being “more likely to undertake higher-risk activities that can 
increase their risk of falls” due to not wanting to bother or become a burden to 
their caregivers (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010, p. 27). Women are 
more likely to injure themselves in a fall with 68% of all falls that caused injury in 
2002 happening to women (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010). Of the falls 
among seniors that resulted in hospitalization in 2008, 51% occurred at home 
and the average length of stay in the hospital was 15 days, “a period 70% longer 
than the length of stay for any other cause of hospitalization for seniors” (Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2010, p. 27). 
Falling can have serious consequences for seniors. In 2009, 52% of all 
accidental deaths in seniors were the result of a fall (Statistics Canada, Table 
102-0540). Even sustaining an injury in a fall can often decrease an individual’s 
quality of life or life expectancy. Falls resulting in a hip fracture make up 38% of 
all falls requiring hospitalization for seniors, representing the major source of the 
injury with the most serious health outcomes for seniors (Public Health Agency of 
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Canada, 2010). Approximately 95% of all hip fractures in seniors are a direct 
result of a fall with the sad result being that “among seniors who sustain a broken 
hip resulting from a fall, 20% die within a year of their fracture due to post-
operative complications and/or pre-existing conditions such as cardiovascular or 
neurological diseases” (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010, p. 27). Even if 
the senior recovers from the fall they can suffer from the psychological effects of 
post-fall syndrome, leaving them with an increased dependence on others for 
daily activities “as well as a loss of autonomy, confusion, immobilization, fear of 
falling and depression” (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010, p. 27). 
Experiencing a fall is possibly one of the worst accidents that can happen 
to a senior in terms of negative health outcomes. The fact that falling is the major 
source of accidental death in seniors is a frightening one, especially when 
combined with the statistic that one third of all seniors experience a fall in a given 
year. As seniors age, their chance of developing an age related impairment to 
their mobility or sensory awareness increases, putting them at an increased risk 
for a fall while performing activities of daily life. Even if a senior experiences a fall 
and survives, they often sustain injuries or psychological effects that leave them 
with an increased dependence on others for assistance performing activities of 
daily life. Seniors who depend on others for assistance performing activities of 
daily life are often unable to obtain sufficient assistance from their family or 
friends and must enter a supportive housing residence. Falls and other accidents 
that leave seniors dependant on others for assistance performing activities of 
daily life increase the demand for supportive housing in this manner. 
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3. Understanding the Supportive Housing Industry 
In order to determine SHAFA’s optimal strategy for entry into the supportive 
housing industry an industry analysis from the perspective of a new entrant was 
required. It was decided to base this analysis on Porter’s Five Forces of 
Competition Framework as it allows analysis of the interplay of forces that 
“defines an industry’s structure and shapes the nature of competitive interaction 
within an industry” (Porter, 2008, p. 79).  
 
Figure 2: Summary of competitive forces in the supportive housing industry 
(Porter, 2008; adapted by author). 
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3.1. Competitive Forces Influencing New Entrants 
There are two major competitive forces influencing the threat of new 
entrants in an industry: “the height of entry barriers that are present and... the 
reaction entrants can expect from incumbents” (Porter, 2008, p. 81). This section 
examines the factors acting as barriers to entry in the supportive housing 
industry, the expected retaliation new entrants elicit from incumbents, and how 
these two forces interact to shape SHAFA’s strategy. 
3.1.1. Sources of Barriers to Entry 
Porter identifies seven major sources of entry barriers that can make an 
industry unattractive to new entrants: supply-side economies of scale, demand-
side benefits of scale, customer switching costs, capital requirements, 
incumbency advantages independent of size, unequal access to distribution 
channels, and restrictive government policy (Porter, 2008). This section 
examines each potential barrier in turn in order to evaluate its potential effects on 
SHAFA’s entry into the supportive housing industry. 
Supply-side economies of scale occur “when firms that produce at larger 
volumes enjoy lower costs per unit because they can spread fixed costs over 
more units, employ more efficient technology, or command better terms from 
suppliers” (Porter, 2008, p. 81). Supply-side economies of scale act as a barrier 
to entry by “forcing the aspiring entrant either to come into the industry on a large 
scale, which requires dislodging entrenched competitors, or to accept a cost 
disadvantage” (Porter, 2008, p. 81). With no individual competitor controlling 
more than 6% of the market (Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a) and the 
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top ten suppliers controlling only 25% of the market (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 
2012), the fragmented nature of the supportive housing industry means that even 
the largest firms are unable to achieve a sufficient supply-side economy of scale 
to be insurmountable to a new entrant. As a result, the chance of supply-side 
economies of scale presenting a barrier to entry for SHAFA is also low. 
The second factor acting as a barrier to entry, demand-side benefits of 
scale, occurs when “a buyer’s willingness to pay for a company’s product 
increases with the number of other buyers who also patronize the company” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 81). Demand-side benefits of scale act as a barrier to entry by 
“limiting the willingness of customers to buy from a newcomer and by reducing 
the price the newcomer can command until it builds up a large base of 
customers” (Porter, 2008, p. 81). Two factors conspire to mitigate the effects of 
demand-side benefits of scale as a barrier to entry in the supportive housing 
industry: a lack of brand recognition among the major suppliers and the fact that 
newer residences are more desirable to customers and can often obtain a price 
premium over residences already on the market. The lack of brand recognition 
among the major suppliers becomes apparent when considering the fact that of 
the 187 supportive housing residences operated by Chartwell Retirement 
Residences only 79 (approximately 42%) are operated under the Chartwell brand 
(Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013b). This lack of brand recognition means 
that customers are often unaware of who the operator of a particular residence 
truly is, indicating that customers are practically unaffected by any network 
effects that contribute to the creation of demand-side benefits of scale. Customer 
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preference for newer residences also increases the willingness of customers to 
purchase from a new entrant and allows new entrants to charge a premium over 
the existing competition. Both of these factors mitigate the influence of demand-
side benefits of scale, indicating that the chance of demand-side benefits of scale 
becoming a significant barrier to entry for SHAFA is also low. 
The third factor acting as a barrier to entry is customer switching costs, or 
the “fixed costs that buyers face when they change suppliers” (Porter, 2008, p. 
81). Customer switching costs act as a barrier to entry by preventing customers 
from adopting new entrants as suppliers by requiring customers to make some 
form of initial investment in order to be able to utilize the replacement product or 
service. In the supportive housing industry customer switching costs are 
extremely high, as there are emotional and physical factors beyond the usual 
economic factors a customer must consider when switching from one supportive 
housing provider to another. This emotional and physical component of the 
switching cost is because, in addition to the disruption of the moving process in a 
resident’s life, it may take time for a resident to acclimatize to a new setting and 
their physical constitution might prevent them from switching at all. In general, 
the switching costs in the supportive housing industry are so high that residents 
usually remain with the same provider throughout the entire duration they remain 
in supportive housing. As a result, supportive housing providers are almost 
entirely reliant on attracting new residents instead of trying to compete with 
existing providers for their customers. The high customer switching costs in the 
supportive housing industry have also forced customers to be extremely selective 
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in choosing supportive housing providers, with newer, more modern facilities 
being in higher demand. Consequently, while customer switching costs in the 
supportive housing industry are high they do not act as an effective barrier to 
entry as new entrants rely heavily on attracting new customers, who prefer new 
entrants due to their newer facilities. As a result, the chance of high customer 
switching costs acting as a barrier to entry for SHAFA is also low. 
Capital requirements, or the necessity to “invest large financial resources 
in order to compete” (Porter, 2008, p. 81) are the fourth factor acting as a barrier 
to entry. Large capital requirements act as barriers to entry by preventing new 
entrants from obtaining the facilities, inventory, or credit they need to operate and 
by limiting the ability of new entrants to absorb any unexpected losses they may 
incur as a result of competition in the new market. Capital requirements in the 
supportive housing industry are often comparatively large as it is often necessary 
for new entrants to construct a new supportive housing facility and it may take 
some time for new entrants to achieve the occupancy levels required to become 
profitable. However, “It is important not to overstate the degree to which capital 
requirements alone deter entry. If industry returns are attractive and are expected 
to remain so, and if capital markets are efficient, investors will provide entrants 
with the funds they need” (Porter, 2008, p. 81). With supportive housing facilities 
able to operate at up to 50% net profit (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012) and 
borrowing rates near historical lows, supportive housing facilities can be 
attractive opportunities for investors, especially considering the growth in the 
senior population. Consequently, while the initial capital requirement to enter the 
 17 
 
supportive housing industry may be high it is not insurmountable. As a result, 
there is a moderate chance of the capital requirements of building a supportive 
housing residence acting as a barrier to entry for SHAFA.  
Incumbency advantages independent of size are the fifth factor acting as a 
barrier to entry, occurring when incumbents “have cost or quality advantages not 
available to potential rivals” (Porter, 2008, p. 81). Incumbency advantages 
independent of size act as a barrier to entry by allowing incumbents to 
monopolize a potential source of competitive advantage, thereby placing new 
entrants at a competitive disadvantage. Within the supportive housing industry 
the primary source of incumbency advantages independent of size is the 
experience incumbents have in operating supportive housing facilities efficiently, 
as other more effective sources of incumbency advantages independent of size 
such as proprietary access to a resource or technology are not applicable to the 
industry. As this experience can eventually be attained by any new entrant to the 
supportive housing industry the chance of incumbency advantages independent 
of size acting as an effective barrier to entry to SHAFA is considered low 
The sixth force acting as a barrier to entry is unequal access to distribution 
channels, as “the more limited the wholesale or retail channels are and the more 
that existing competitors have tied them up, the tougher entry into an industry will 
be. Sometimes access to distribution is so high a barrier that new entrants must 
bypass distribution channels altogether or create their own” (Porter, 2008, p. 82). 
This is certainly the case in the supportive housing industry, where each 
competitor acts as its own distribution channel, marketing and selling units in its 
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own residences. While this may be a high barrier to entry in other industries, it is 
simply standard operating procedure in the supportive housing industry. As such, 
the chance of unequal access to distribution channels acting as an effective 
barrier to entry to SHAFA is low. 
The seventh and final factor that contributes to increasing the barrier to 
entry is restrictive government policy, which “can hinder or aid new entry directly, 
as well as amplify (or nullify) the other entry barriers” (Porter, 2008, p. 82). 
Restrictive government policy acts as a barrier to entry by enacting licensing 
requirements, restricting foreign investment, or by increasing “other entry barriers 
through such means as expansive patenting rules... or environmental or safety 
regulations that raise scale economies facing newcomers” (Porter, 2008, p. 82). 
As previously mentioned, the supportive housing industry is heavily regulated by 
government policy, as seniors and other individuals with disabilities represent 
one of the most vulnerable segments of the population. However, the level of 
government regulation affecting a segment of the supportive housing industry is 
determined by the level of care provided by that segment. As a result, 
Independent Living residences have minimal regulation and Long Term Care 
residences must comply with extensive regulation. As SHAFA aims to utilize 
modern technology to enable seniors to remain independent for as long as 
possible it would fall somewhere between Independent Living and Assisted 
Living and therefore would be subject to minimal to average levels of government 
regulation. As a result, the chance of restrictive government policy acting as an 
effective barrier to entry for SHAFA is also low to moderate. 
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3.1.2. The Threat of Retaliation 
The expected retaliation from incumbents is the second competitive force 
businesses must consider when deciding to enter a new industry, as “how 
potential entrants believe incumbents may react will also influence their decision 
to enter or stay out of an industry. If reaction is vigorous and protracted enough, 
the profit potential of participating in the industry can fall below the cost of capital” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 82). Porter identifies four factors new entrants can use to 
determine the extent of expected retaliation form incumbents (Porter, 2008). If 
incumbents have previously responded vigorously to new entrants, possess 
substantial resources to retaliate, seem likely to cut prices to retain market share, 
or if industry growth is slow so newcomers can gain volume only by taking it from 
incumbents, then new entrants should be more likely to fear the expected 
retaliation from incumbents (Porter, 2008). 
Within the supportive housing industry, the threat of expected retaliation is 
so low as to be almost nonexistent. Incumbents do not respond vigorously to new 
entrants as evidenced by the extremely fragmented nature of the industry. If 
incumbents did respond vigorously to new entrants, there would not be nearly as 
many competitors in the industry as there are currently. As such, there is a low 
chance of SHAFA experiencing retaliation from incumbents. 
One reason for this lack of response is due to a lack of sufficient 
resources to retaliate. While some of the larger incumbents in the supportive 
housing industry may possess sufficient “excess cash and unused borrowing 
power” (Porter, 2008, p. 82) to retaliate, many of the smaller incumbents do not 
and retaliation would place them at a competitive disadvantage. Additionally, the 
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typical methods of utilizing available resources to retaliate such as excess 
“available productive capacity, or clout with distribution channels and customers” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 82), are not available to the supportive housing industry. 
Increasing productive capacity is constrained by the significant amount of capital 
and resources required to construct a new supportive housing residence, 
supportive housing companies usually act as their own distribution channels, and 
companies do not have significant influence with customers as shown by the low 
brand recognition across the industry. 
Another reason for the lack of response is due to an unwillingness to cut 
prices by incumbents. The reasons for this unwillingness are twofold. Incumbents 
in the supportive housing industry are already at a price disadvantage compared 
to new entrants due to customer willingness to pay a premium for new facilities. 
Additionally, the high switching costs in the supportive housing industry, including 
the potential mental and physical components, make customers extremely 
unwilling to change providers. As a result, incumbents have no incentive to cut 
their prices as they are already at a price disadvantage compared to new 
entrants and are unlikely to lose customers to new entrants due to the high 
switching costs inherent in the supportive housing industry. 
Perhaps the most important factor resulting in the incumbents’ 
unwillingness to retaliate is the growth rate of the industry. Currently the 
proportion of seniors in Canada’s population is growing so rapidly that vacancy 
rates across the supportive housing industry are hovering at around 10% despite 
significant increases in supply (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 
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2013b). As Canada’s senior population ages and they become more dependent 
due to age related infirmities the demand for supportive housing will only 
increase. Incumbents in the supportive housing industry recognize this 
impending demographic shift and recognize that there is little incentive for them 
to compete when demand for their services remains essentially unaffected by the 
presence of new entrants in the industry.  
3.1.3. Analysis from an Entrant’s Perspective 
Overall, the two major competitive forces threatening new entrants in an 
industry, “the height of entry barriers that are present and ... the reaction entrants 
can expect from incumbents” (Porter, 2008, p. 81), are low in the supportive 
housing industry. Of the seven factors contributing to barriers to entry, only two, 
capital requirements and restrictive government policy, are a credible threat to 
SHAFA. The inability of incumbents in the supportive housing industry to 
establish both supply-side economies of scale and demand-side benefits of scale 
is a particular advantage for new entrants in the supportive housing industry, as 
these are the primary methods incumbents can utilize to exclude new entrants in 
industries without incumbency advantages independent of size. The overall low 
barriers to entry combined with the relative lack of a threat of retaliation makes 
the supportive housing industry attractive to new entrants such as SHAFA. As a 
result, a thoroughly planned and sufficiently funded new entrant should have little 
difficulty entering the supportive housing industry. Provided SHAFA remains 
aware of its capital requirements and follows government policy it should have 
little difficulty entering the industry. 
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3.2. The Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
The bargaining power of suppliers is another competitive force affecting 
profitability in an industry as “powerful suppliers capture more of the value for 
themselves by charging higher prices, limiting quality or services, or shifting costs 
to industry participants” (Porter, 2008, p. 82). Porter identifies six factors 
influencing the bargaining power of suppliers: the concentration of suppliers 
relative to the industry, the dependence of suppliers on the industry for revenue, 
high switching costs in changing suppliers, differentiation of supplier products, 
the existence of substitute suppliers, and the threat of suppliers integrating 
forward into the industry (Porter, 2008). Due to the significant capital investment 
required to construct a supportive housing residence, the primary supplier acting 
as a gatekeeper to the supportive housing industry is the construction industry. 
As the vast majority of SHAFA’s start up costs will go to the construction of a 
supportive housing residence the power of suppliers in the construction industry 
will be the primary focus of this section. 
3.2.1. The Bargaining Power of the Construction Industry 
The first factor influencing the bargaining power of suppliers is the 
concentration of suppliers relative to the industry (Porter, 2008). If a supplier has 
a near monopoly in supplying an industry whose customers can freely switch 
between providers it can increase its prices in order to “squeeze profitability out 
of an industry that is unable to pass on cost increases in its own prices” (Porter, 
2008, p. 82). Luckily for SHAFA, this is not the case for construction suppliers to 
the supportive housing industry due to two reasons. The primary reason 
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construction suppliers do not have this type of influence on the supportive 
housing industry is because, despite the significant fragmentation within the 
supportive housing industry, there is also significant fragmentation in the 
construction industry and supportive housing providers often have a number of 
construction suppliers to choose from when building their residences. 
Additionally, the customers of the supportive housing industry often have 
extremely high switching costs and as a result, the supportive housing industry 
can often pass cost increases directly to its customers. The fragmentation of the 
construction industry and the ability of the supportive housing industry to pass its 
costs to its customers due to their high switching costs limit the ability of the 
construction industry to affect the profitability of the supportive housing industry. 
The second factor influencing the bargaining power of suppliers is the 
dependence of suppliers on the industry for revenue (Porter, 2008). If a particular 
supplier is supplying a variety of industries, the supplier “will not hesitate to 
extract maximum profits from each one” (Porter, 2008, p. 82) as its success is 
not dependent solely on the success of any single customer. Unfortunately for 
SHAFA, this is the case for construction suppliers to the supportive housing 
industry, as companies in the construction industry supply many other industries 
besides the supportive housing industry. As a result, construction suppliers will 
charge SHAFA the highest amount they can that will not result in SHAFA 
choosing another supplier. This means that SHAFA must ensure that the 
construction supplier it chooses has a record of delivering the specified 
construction project on schedule and under budget. 
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The third competitive force influencing the bargaining power of suppliers is 
the switching costs of changing suppliers, as “when switching costs are high, 
industry participants find it hard to play suppliers off against one another” (Porter, 
2008, p. 83). Fortunately for SHAFA the switching costs involved in changing 
construction suppliers, while not insignificant, are not sufficient to preclude the 
possibility of changing suppliers entirely as there is no specialized equipment or 
training necessary to use one supplier’s product instead of another’s. 
Additionally, while the construction of a new supportive housing residence is a 
significant investment from the supportive housing company it is a one-time 
investment and there is often no need to build an ongoing business relationship 
with the construction provider. These factors mitigate the bargaining power of 
construction suppliers to the supportive housing industry as if they set their prices 
too high SHAFA can simply choose a different supplier. 
The fourth factor influencing the bargaining power of suppliers is the 
differentiation of supplier products, as suppliers offering differentiated products 
have more bargaining power over suppliers offering generic products (Porter, 
2008). The construction suppliers to the supportive housing industry do not 
supply differentiated products as they produce buildings constructed according to 
the design specifications of the supportive housing company customer 
regardless of supplier. Therefore, the major factors that the supportive housing 
company must consider when choosing a supplier are the cost, quality, and 
duration of the construction project. The inability of construction suppliers to the 
supportive housing industry to differentiate their products other than by the three 
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aforementioned factors further mitigates their bargaining power. This further 
reduces their ability to extract significant profits from supportive housing industry 
customers such as SHAFA. 
The fifth factor influencing the bargaining power of suppliers is the 
existence of substitute suppliers, as the lack of a suitable alternative for the 
product or service that a supplier provides increases the supplier’s bargaining 
power (Porter, 2008). Hypothetically, if construction suppliers to the supportive 
housing industry set their prices sufficiently high their supportive housing industry 
customers could instead purchase a pre-existing building and renovate it to suit 
their needs. This remains an unattractive option as supportive housing 
companies would rather construct a new building due to the preference of their 
customers for newer facilities and will often pay a premium to do so. While 
renovating an existing building is not an ideal option for SHAFA it nevertheless 
sets an upper limit to the price it will be willing to pay a construction supplier, 
limiting the supplier’s bargaining power to some extent. 
The final factor influencing the bargaining power of suppliers is the threat 
of suppliers integrating forward into the industry, as “if industry participants make 
too much money relative to suppliers, they will induce suppliers to enter the 
market” (Porter, 2008, p. 83). While it is potentially possible for construction 
suppliers to integrate forward into the supportive housing industry it remains 
unlikely that they will do so. The underlying reason behind the unwillingness to 
integrate is that providing structured care for the elderly and disabled requires 
significantly different competencies and skill sets from those useful in the 
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construction industry. As a result, while the supportive housing industry may 
operate at significantly higher profit margins than the construction industry, the 
significant lack of overlap between the skill sets required by each industry often 
precludes the potential for forward integration. The difficulty construction industry 
suppliers would experience if they pursue forward integration into the supportive 
housing industry further limits their bargaining power. 
3.2.2. Analysis from an Entrant’s Perspective 
As previously mentioned, since the vast majority of a supportive housing 
company’s start up costs will go to the construction of a supportive housing 
residence, the power of suppliers in the construction industry should be the 
primary concern of start-ups like SHAFA. Of the six factors affecting the 
bargaining power of suppliers, only one, the lack of dependence on the 
supportive housing industry for revenue, serves to increase the bargaining power 
of construction suppliers to the supportive housing industry, whereas the 
remaining five constrain their bargaining power in some way. As a result, 
businesses in the supportive housing industry can afford to be relatively price 
sensitive when it comes to selecting a construction supplier. The low bargaining 
power of construction suppliers is excellent from the perspective of a new entrant 
to the supportive housing industry such as SHAFA, as it allows the new entrant 
to deliver similar quality products and services as an incumbent while keeping 
costs minimal. It is for this reason that the bargaining power of construction 
suppliers to the supportive housing industry is unlikely to have a significant 
impact on SHAFA’s profitability. 
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3.3. The Bargaining Power of Buyers 
There are two major forces influencing the bargaining power of buyers in 
an industry: their negotiating leverage relative to industry participants and their 
price sensitivity (Porter, 2008). This section examines how the interaction 
between the factors affecting the negotiating leverage of buyers from the 
supportive housing industry and the factors affecting their price sensitivity shapes 
SHAFA’s strategy. 
3.3.1. Negotiating Leverage 
Porter identifies four major sources of negotiating leverage for buyers: 
industry competition for buyers, a lack of differentiation with competitive products, 
a lack of buyer switching costs, and the threat of buyers integrating backward 
into the industry (Porter, 2008). This section examines each source of negotiating 
leverage in turn in order to determine the extent to which they affect the 
purchasing decisions of SHAFA’s potential customers. 
The first source of negotiating leverage for buyers is due to industry 
competition for buyers (Porter, 2008). Industry competition for buyers can arise 
because of either a lack of buyers or a tendency by buyers to make large volume 
purchases (Porter, 2008). Both of these situations increase the competition for 
buyers between industry competitors and often lead to steep discounting (Porter, 
2008). Fortunately for SHAFA, both of these situations are not prevalent among 
the buyers of supportive housing industry products due to two reasons. First, the 
buyers of supportive housing industry products are usually individuals buying 
units for their own use and as a result large volume purchases are exceedingly 
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rare. Second, due to the demographic factors discussed in section 2.2, there are 
an increasing number of buyers for the supportive housing industry’s products. 
Both of these factors contribute towards decreasing the negotiating leverage of 
buyers for the supportive housing industry’s products. 
The second source of negotiating leverage for buyers is a lack of 
differentiation between competitor products, as “if buyers believe they can always 
find an equivalent product, they tend to play one vendor against another” (Porter, 
2008, p. 83). Currently the lack of differentiation between products offered by 
competitors in the supportive housing industry is the major source of negotiating 
leverage for buyers of supportive housing industry products. While competitors 
within the supportive housing industry often attempt to differentiate themselves 
from their competitors through location or access to particular amenities, the 
underlying product or service remains relatively similar. This increases the 
negotiating leverage for buyers of supportive housing industry products, but also 
presents an opportunity for a business with a sufficiently differentiated product to 
attract willing buyers even if it charges a premium compared to its less 
differentiated competitors. 
The third source of negotiating leverage for buyers is a lack of buyer 
switching costs, allowing buyers to change suppliers at will and increasing the 
willingness of suppliers to compete with each other in order to retain customers 
(Porter, 2008). As there is often a significant mental and physical component to 
the buyer switching costs in the supportive housing industry in addition to the 
usual financial considerations, the buyer switching costs in the supportive 
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housing industry are often so great that it is exceedingly rare for a buyer to 
change suppliers once the initial purchasing decision has been made. One 
outcome that arises because of this situation is that a supportive housing 
provider that is able to attract buyers by providing a differentiated product is more 
likely to retain those customers while still charging a premium for its products. As 
a result, it is becoming increasingly apparent that it is possible for SHAFA to 
achieve a significant source of competitive advantage if it is able to develop 
some method of differentiating itself from its competitors. 
The final source of negotiating leverage for buyers is the threat of buyers 
integrating backward into the industry (Porter, 2008). As the buyers of supportive 
housing industry products are primarily seniors interested in exchanging the 
responsibilities of owning real estate for assistance or care (Baybridge Seniors 
Housing, 2012), the threat of backwards integration into the industry is almost 
nonexistent as doing so would increase their responsibilities and stress during a 
time of their lives that they wish to be free of such concerns. The lack of a 
credible threat of buyers integrating backwards into the supportive housing 
industry significantly reduces their negotiating leverage.  
3.3.2. Price Sensitivity 
Porter also identifies four major factors affecting the price sensitivity of 
buyers (Porter, 2008). If the product represents a significant fraction of the 
buyer’s costs, the buyer is under pressure to reduce purchasing costs, the quality 
of the buyer’s products or services are unaffected by the purchased product, or 
the purchased product has little effect on the buyer’s other costs then the buyer 
 30 
 
is likely to be more price sensitive (Porter, 2008). This section examines each 
factor affecting the price sensitivity of buyers in turn in order to determine the 
extent to which they affect the price sensitivity of SHAFA’s potential customers. 
The first factor affecting the price sensitivity of buyers is whether the 
product represents a significant fraction of the buyer’s costs (Porter, 2008). If the 
product a buyer “purchases from the industry represents a significant fraction of 
its cost structure or procurement budget ... buyers are likely to shop around and 
bargain hard” (Porter, 2008, p. 84). As the buyers of supportive housing units are 
often retirees or other individuals on limited budgets, the purchase of a 
supportive housing unit likely represents a significant proportion of their budget 
and they are very price sensitive and therefore very likely to shop around and 
bargain hard. This factor will limit the amount SHAFA can charge for its units and 
therefore the extent to which SHAFA can profit off its customers. 
The second factor affecting the price sensitivity of buyers is the amount of 
pressure the buyer is under to reduce purchasing costs, as buyers under 
pressure to reduce purchasing costs are more price sensitive (Porter, 2008). 
Again, as the buyers of supportive housing units are usually on limited budgets 
they are often under pressure to reduce their purchasing costs and likely to be 
very price sensitive. This also limits the amount SHAFA can charge for its units 
and therefore the extent to which SHAFA can profit off its customers. The 
combination of these two factors increasing price sensitivity is the main reason 
the capture rate for the industry hovers at around 10% of Canada’s senior 
population (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2013b). 
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The third factor affecting the price sensitivity of buyers is whether the 
quality of the purchased product affects the quality of the buyer’s products or 
services (Porter, 2008). In situations where “quality is very much affected by the 
industry’s product, buyers are generally less price sensitive” (Porter, 2008, p. 84). 
As it is highly likely that the quality of the care received in the supportive housing 
unit determines the quality of the resident’s remaining lifespan, it is important for 
buyers to obtain the highest quality of care that they can afford. This desire to 
pay higher prices for an increased quality of care reduces the price sensitivity of 
buyers in the supportive housing industry. As a result, if SHAFA is able to find 
some method of differentiating itself from other competitors based on the quality 
of the care it provides, it is likely that SHAFA will be able to find willing buyers for 
its supportive housing units, even at increased prices relative to its competitors. 
The final factor affecting the price sensitivity of buyers is the effect that the 
purchased product has on the buyer’s other costs (Porter, 2008). In situations 
“where an industry’s product or service can pay for itself many times over by 
improving performance or reducing labour, material, or other costs, buyers are 
usually more interested in quality than in price” (Porter, 2008, p. 84). As buyers of 
supportive housing units are specifically interested in reducing the labour and 
maintenance responsibilities inherent in property ownership, it is again important 
for them to obtain the highest quality of care they can afford. Again, if SHAFA is 
able to find some method of differentiating itself from other competitors based on 
quality it is likely that it will be able to find willing buyers even at increased prices 
relative to its competitors. 
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3.3.3. Analysis from an Entrant’s Perspective 
Perhaps more than any other of Porter’s Five Forces of Competition it is 
the bargaining power of buyers that has the greatest effect on the profitability and 
sustainability of competitors in the supportive housing industry. Of the four 
factors affecting each of the two major forces influencing the bargaining power of 
buyers in an industry, i.e. their negotiating leverage relative to industry 
participants and their price sensitivity (Porter, 2008), two serve to increase buyer 
bargaining power and two serve to moderate it. In order for an entrant to 
maximize its profitability in the supportive housing industry, it is essential that it 
take advantage of the characteristics that moderate the bargaining power of 
buyers while simultaneously minimizing the characteristics that increase buyer 
bargaining power. 
One method by which a new entrant, such as SHAFA, can accomplish this 
is through providing a differentiated product. Providing a differentiated product to 
the supportive housing industry would allow a new entrant to reduce buyer 
negotiating leverage by enticing new buyers away from less differentiated 
competitors. At the same time, providing a quality differentiated product lowers 
buyer price sensitivity by increasing the quality of the buyer’s services and 
reducing the buyer’s other costs. As the buyers of supportive housing industry 
products are already extremely price sensitive due to their lack of income and 
limited budgets, it is extremely important to provide an enhanced value 
proposition to attract new buyers. After the initial purchasing decision, however, 
the high switching costs often lock the buyer into staying with their original 
supplier, making the initial decision to choose SHAFA a critical one. 
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3.4. The Threat of Substitute Products or Services 
According to Porter, “a substitute performs the same or a similar function 
as an industry’s product by a different means” (Porter, 2008, p. 84). In situations 
where “the threat of substitutes is high, industry profitability suffers. Substitute 
products or services limit an industry’s profit potential by placing a ceiling on 
prices. If an industry does not distance itself from substitutes through product 
performance, marketing, or other means, it will suffer in terms of profitability—
and often growth potential” (Porter, 2008, p. 84). There are two substitutes for the 
supportive housing industry’s products: either renovating an existing house to 
meet the senior’s needs or for the senior to manage without any special 
assistance. The second option is the most popular, as the capture rate for the 
supportive housing industry hovers at around 10% of the total senior population 
across Canada (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2013b). The low 
capture rate is because there are many seniors who never require the services 
that the supportive housing industry offers, and others who can get by with 
cheaply renovating their home to include one or two assistive devices and relying 
on assistance from friends or relatives. For some however, simply no available 
substitute provides the support and assistance they require except for the 
supportive housing industry. 
3.4.1. Factors Affecting the Threat of Substitution 
The reality that some seniors will never require supportive housing, while 
for others supportive housing is a necessity is a result of the “price-performance 
trade-off” (Porter, 2008, p. 84). Porter explains, “The threat of a substitute is high 
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if it offers an attractive price-performance trade-off to the industry’s product” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 84). Since, in essence, the cost of the substitute for the 
supportive housing industry’s product is more intangible than tangible, e.g. the 
responsibilities and physical demands of home ownership and maintenance, 
many seniors simply do not need the level of care provided by the supportive 
housing industry for any price. At the same time however, for those who are 
either unable or unwilling to pay the intangible price of home ownership the 
services of the supportive housing industry are available for a fee. As a result, for 
some the fees charged by the supportive housing industry are unquestionably 
too high, but for others there is simply no alternative. It is for this reason that the 
threat of substitution due to the price-performance trade-off is low. 
The second factor contributing to the threat of substitution is the cost of 
switching to the substitute (Porter, 2008). According to Porter, “the threat of a 
substitute is high if ... the buyer’s cost of switching to the substitute is low” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 84-85). In the supportive housing industry’s case, the switching 
cost is essentially zero as there is no additional cost to a potential customer if the 
customer instead chooses to stay in his or her own home. In fact, there is often a 
switching cost associated with purchasing a supportive housing unit due to the 
expenses associated with moving and the sale of the original residence. Despite 
this, due to health and other issues there is often no other option for the 
individual except to move into a supportive housing residence. As a result, this 
lack of switching cost increases the threat of substitution, but is insufficient to 
prevent the purchase of supportive housing units altogether. 
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3.4.2. Analysis from an Entrant’s Perspective 
The supportive housing industry is interesting in that the substitutes for its 
products and services are so effective that they preclude the purchase of 
supportive housing industry products almost entirely until a certain price-
performance threshold is reached, above which it becomes extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to continue utilizing the substitutes. The result of the extreme 
effectiveness of substitutes for the supportive housing industry’s products is the 
low capture rate of the supportive housing industry, which hovers at around 10% 
of the total senior population across Canada (Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation, 2013b). The low capture rate combined with the high switching 
costs after the initial purchase explain why it is so important for new entrants in 
the supportive housing industry to attract new customers, as they are competing 
with existing competitors for an extremely small subsection of the population and 
it is extremely difficult to attract customers away from existing competitors. 
While the existing competitors in the supportive housing industry only 
need to worry about attracting enough new customers to replace any vacancies 
they have in their residences, new entrants need to attract as many new 
customers as possible in order to fill their residences to the point where they 
become profitable as quickly as possible. Despite the fact that new customers for 
supportive housing will soon be appearing at an unprecedented rate due to the 
senescence of the baby boomers, new entrants must still find ways to entice new 
customers away from choosing established competitors. Again, if SHAFA is able 
to find some method of differentiating its products it is likely that it will be able to 
find willing buyers even at increased prices relative to its competitors. 
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3.5. Rivalry among Existing Competitors 
Rivalry among existing competitors is the final force affecting profitability in 
an industry, and can take “many familiar forms, including price discounting, new 
product introductions, advertising campaigns, and service improvements” (Porter, 
2008, p. 85). According to Porter, “The degree to which rivalry drives down an 
industry’s profit potential depends, first, on the intensity with which companies 
compete and, second, on the basis on which they compete” (Porter, 2008, p. 85). 
This section examines the factors affecting the intensity of the rivalry as well as 
the basis of competition within the supportive housing industry. Understanding 
these factors and their effects on competition in the supportive housing industry 
will be a key factor in determining SHAFA’s strategy. 
3.5.1. Competitive Landscape and Competitors 
In order to understand the nature of competition within the supportive 
housing industry, we must first understand the competitive landscape and 
competitors. Currently, the supportive housing market in Canada is highly 
fragmented with no single entity controlling more than 6.0% of the market 
(Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a). Despite some recent consolidation 
(Marketwire, 2012), the top ten suppliers only control just over 25% of the market 
(Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). In recent years, there has been a significant 
decrease in the construction of supportive housing residences from the maximum 
of 65,879 new units in 1999 to a minimum of 4,838 in 2009 although numbers 
have started to rebound slightly (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). This trend 
has resulted in a significant barrier to entry so that successfully capitalized and 
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developed projects will have a significant advantage over the competition already 
in place (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012). The fragmented nature of the 
market combined with strong demand across the industry and high profit margins 
indicates that there are opportunities for start ups like SHAFA to succeed in the 
supportive housing industry. 
As of December 31, 2012, the three largest providers of supportive 
housing in Canada are Chartwell, Revera, and Extendicare (Chartwell 
Retirement Residences, 2013a). Together these three companies control 
approximately 13.5% of the roughly 422,000 supportive housing suites in Canada 
(Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a). An analysis of these three 
companies will provide SHAFA with a rough overview of the competitive 
landscape within the highly fragmented Canadian supportive housing market. 
3.5.2. Chartwell 
Formed in 2003 following the merger of Chartwell Care Corporation, Alert 
Care Corporation, JBG Management Inc. and CEBY Management Limited, 
Chartwell is a Canadian real estate investment trust that owns and manages a 
number of supportive housing residences across North America (Chartwell 
Retirement Residences, 2003). In the 10 years since raising $210 million from 
their IPO in 2003, Chartwell has grown into the largest provider of supportive 
housing in Canada (Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a). 
Chartwell is an open-ended real estate investment trust (REIT) 
established under the laws of the Province of Ontario. The REIT indirectly holds 
a portfolio of supportive housing facilities across the complete spectrum of care 
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from independent living facilities, through assisted living facilities to long-term 
care facilities. As of December 31, 2012 Chartwell’s portfolio of owned and/or 
managed supportive housing facilities consists of interests in 32,460 suites in 
236 facilities operating in the Provinces of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and 
Quebec (Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a). Chartwell primarily operates 
independent living suites, which represent 61% of Chartwell’s total suites 
(Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a). With 74% of its suites located in 
Canada, Chartwell operates primarily in Canada although it is concentrated in 
Ontario and Quebec with 65% of its suites located in those two provinces 
(Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a). In addition to managing its own 
properties, Chartwell provides management and advisory services to third party 
owners of supportive housing facilities. 
3.5.3. Revera 
Formed from Retirement Residences REIT after its purchase for 
approximately $780 million by the Public Sector Pension Investment Board in 
February, 2007 (Retirement Residences Real Estate Investment Trust, 2007), 
Revera can trace its roots back to its original inception as the Central Park Lodge 
in Winnipeg Manitoba in 1961 (Revera, 2012). It expanded across Canada under 
the Central Park Lodges brand, eventually expanding into the United States in 
1988 (Revera, 2012). Eventually, after Retirement Residences REIT’s $200 
million IPO in 2001, Retirement Residences REIT bought Central Park Lodges 
(Retirement Residences Real Estate Investment Trust, 2001). 
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Currently, Revera is a private company, wholly owned by the Public 
Sector Pension Investment Board (Retirement Residences Real Estate 
Investment Trust, 2007). Due to a combination of the Public Sector Pension 
Investment Board’s status as a private company and the diversified real estate 
investment portfolio it controls, Revera’s financials are difficult to distinguish from 
other holdings. As a result, concrete financial and operational information about 
Revera is hard to come by. However, at the end of 2012 Revera operated 173 
supportive housing and long-term care homes, which Chartwell estimates contain 
approximately 19,900 suites, giving them control of approximately 4.7% of the 
Canadian market (Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a). With nearly 5% of 
the Canadian supportive housing market under its control, Revera is nearly twice 
the size of the next largest competitor and firmly ensconced as the second 
largest company in the industry. 
3.5.4. Extendicare 
Extendicare’s history is a convoluted one. Founded as Pendexcare Ltd. in 
1968 before changing its name to Extendicare (Canada) Ltd. later in the year, 
Extendicare originally operated a number of long term care residences in Ontario 
(Extendicare Inc., 2013b). Between 1974 and 1976 Extendicare (Canada) Ltd. 
dropped the (Canada) from its name and expanded into the United States by 
acquiring “Medco Centers, Inc., a nursing home operator with 25 locations in 
Indiana and Kentucky” (Extendicare Inc., 2013b). In 1980, Extendicare acquired 
interest in Crown Life Insurance Company and changed its name to Crownx Inc. 
in 1983 (Extendicare Inc., 2013b). Crownx Inc. changed its name back to 
 40 
 
Extendicare Inc. in 1994 and expanded into the assisted living market in the 
United States (Extendicare Inc., 2013b). In 1998, Extendicare sold its interest in 
Crown Life Insurance Company in order to focus on expanding its long-term care 
business (Extendicare Inc., 2013b). In 2006 Extendicare converted to 
Extendicare Real Estate Investments Trust, a Canadian real estate investment 
trust, before converting back to a corporation in 2012 (Extendicare Inc., 2013b). 
As of the end of 2012, Extendicare owns and operates 87 supportive 
housing and long-term care facilities in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and 
Ontario (Extendicare Inc., 2013a). Together these facilities provide 11,347 suites 
giving Extendicare control of approximately 2.7% of the Canadian supportive 
housing market (Chartwell Retirement Residences, 2013a). In Canada, 
Extendicare primarily focuses on the long-term care market, with assisted and 
independent living suites representing less than 5% of Extendicare’s Canadian 
operations (Extendicare Inc., 2013a). Due to Extendicare’s focus on the long-
term care market and SHAFA’s focus on operating primarily within the 
Independent to Assisted Living market, competition from Extendicare is unlikely. 
3.5.5. The Intensity of Competition 
There are five major factors that can increase the intensity of rivalry within 
an industry: numerous similar competitors, slow industry growth, high exit 
barriers, committed and ambitious rivals, and a lack of effective signalling 
between rivals (Porter, 2008). This section examines each factor in turn in order 
to determine the extent to which it increases the rivalry within the supportive 
housing industry. 
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The first factor increasing the intensity of rivalry within an industry is if, 
“competitors are numerous or are roughly equal in size and power” as “in such 
situations, rivals find it hard to avoid poaching business” and that “without an 
industry leader, practices desirable for the industry as a whole go unenforced” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 85). Given the fragmented nature of the supportive housing 
industry, where the majority of competitors only operate a single supportive 
housing residence, one would expect rivalry to be especially intense. This is not 
exactly the observed outcome, as the high switching costs allow competitors to 
maintain their market share while the unprecedented increase in the senior 
population due to the senescence of the baby boomers ensures that there will be 
no shortage of demand for supportive housing industry products and services in 
the near future. As a result, the existence of numerous similar competitors 
contributes at most a moderate increase to the intensity of rivalry in the industry. 
The second factor increasing the intensity of rivalry within an industry is 
slow industry growth, as “slow growth precipitates fights for market share” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 85). This is definitely not the case in the supportive housing 
industry. The main customers of the supportive housing industry are seniors, 
which, thanks to the massive demographic shift brought about by baby boomers 
reaching retirement age, are experiencing an unprecedented increase in number. 
This unprecedented increase in the senior population has the effect of creating 
unprecedented demand for supportive housing industry products and services. 
As a result, the growth rate of the supportive housing industry drastically reduces 
industry rivalry. 
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The third factor increasing the intensity of rivalry within an industry is high 
exit barriers, which “arise because of such things as highly specialized assets or 
management’s devotion to a particular business” and “keep companies in the 
market even though they may be earning low or negative returns” (Porter, 2008, 
p. 85). In some respects, the exit barriers in the supportive housing industry are 
low as it is relatively easy to convert a supportive housing residence into simply a 
housing residence. However, supportive housing units are often able to 
command premium rental rates compared to ordinary residential housing units. If 
a developer has budgeted based on being able to obtain the premium rental 
rates for supportive housing units any inability to achieve that rate could prove 
detrimental to their bottom line. As a result, exit barriers only contribute a low to 
moderate increase to the intensity of rivalry in the supportive housing industry. 
The fourth factor increasing the intensity of rivalry within an industry is if 
“rivals are highly committed to the business and have aspirations for leadership, 
especially if they have goals that go beyond economic performance in the 
particular industry” (Porter, 2008, p. 85). Again, given the fragmented nature of 
the supportive housing industry where the majority of competitors only operate a 
single supportive housing residence, it is unlikely that any of these smaller 
competitors have much aspiration for leadership and remain committed to the 
industry simply due to the premium rental rates they can obtain compared to 
providing residential housing units. The relative lack of commitment and ambition 
in the majority of competitors in the supportive housing industry has a 
corresponding lack of effect on increasing the intensity of the rivalry within the 
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industry. A committed, ambitious, entrant could potentially make significant 
headway in the industry by outcompeting its less ambitious rivals. 
The final factor increasing the intensity of rivalry within an industry is if, 
“firms cannot read each other’s signals well because of lack of familiarity with 
one another, diverse approaches to competing, or differing goals” (Porter, 2008, 
p. 85). In the supportive housing industry, companies are generally familiar with 
their competitors within a local geographic area and usually have similar 
approaches to competition. Where companies can differ is in their goals. It is 
often difficult for a company to discern the goals of another company without 
developing a close business relationship. As most companies in the supportive 
housing industry do not work closely with their competitors, it is likely that a lack 
of communication about each company’s goals can potentially increase the 
intensity of the rivalry within the industry. Currently however, the high demand for 
the supportive housing industry’s products and services overwhelms any 
increase in intensity of rivalry within the industry brought on by a lack of 
signalling. As a result, a lack of effective signalling can only contribute a low to 
moderate increase to the intensity of rivalry in the supportive housing industry. 
3.5.6. The Basis of Competition 
There are two types of competition that can affect the intensity of rivalry 
within an industry: price competition and nonprice competition (Porter, 2008). 
According to Porter, “Rivalry is especially destructive to profitability if it gravitates 
solely to price because price competition transfers profits directly from an 
industry to its customers. Price cuts are usually easy for competitors to see and 
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match, making successive rounds of retaliation likely” (Porter, 2008, p. 85). 
Porter identifies four industry characteristics that contribute to the intensity of 
price competition (Porter, 2008). If an industry possesses high fixed costs, low 
marginal costs, and the necessity to expand capacity in large volumes to be 
efficient, while offering perishable products or similar products with low switching 
costs, it is highly likely to experience price competition (Porter, 2008). 
An industry with high fixed costs and low marginal costs is likely to 
experience price competition because this cost structure “creates intense 
pressure for competitors to cut prices below their average costs, even close to 
their marginal costs, to steal incremental customers while still making some 
contribution to fixed costs” (Porter, 2008, p. 85). While it is true that the 
supportive housing industry possesses high fixed costs and low marginal costs, it 
is only true up to the point where the supportive housing residence reaches 
capacity, as above this point the marginal cost of building an additional residence 
becomes prohibitive. As a result, the majority of supportive housing companies 
are only concerned with reaching their maximum occupancy as quickly as 
possible and then maintaining it. It is therefore in their best interests to avoid 
price competition as doing so would severely limit their profitability at their 
maximum capacity. 
An industry with the necessity to expand capacity in large volumes to be 
efficient will likely experience price competition, as this requirement “disrupts the 
industry’s supply-demand balance and often leads to long and recurring periods 
of overcapacity and price cutting” (Porter, 2008, p. 85). It is debatable whether 
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the supportive housing industry exhibits this characteristic. While expanding 
capacity by building another supportive housing residence would approximately 
double the capacity of the majority of supportive housing companies, it would 
have a negligible effect on the industry as a whole. Additionally, the upcoming 
demographic shift brought about by the senescence of the baby boomers, has 
already shifted the supportive housing industry’s supply-demand balance heavily 
towards the demand side. This lack of capacity and strong demand indicates that 
the industry is unlikely to experience price competition due to this characteristic. 
The third characteristic contributing to the intensity of price competition is 
rivals offering similar products with low switching costs, as this combination of 
characteristics “encourages competitors to cut prices to win new customers” 
(Porter, 2008, p. 85). While supportive housing residences are in general 
relatively similar, they are somewhat successful at differentiating themselves 
based on cosmetic or service features. This limited differentiation combined with 
the aforementioned high switching costs after the initial purchase limit the 
intensity of price competition in the supportive housing industry. As a result, the 
chance of SHAFA experiencing price competition due to this characteristic is low. 
The final characteristic as contributing to the intensity of price competition 
is manufacturing or supplying a perishable product, as “perishability creates a 
strong temptation to cut prices and sell a product while it still has value” (Porter, 
2008, p. 85). Unlike their customers, supportive housing industry products are 
not particularly perishable. Although supportive housing residences do decline in 
value over time, with proper construction and maintenance the decline is 
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relatively gradual, and some residences have remained in continuous operation 
for more than a century (Criscione, 2013). As a result, there is not a great deal of 
incentive for supportive housing suppliers to cut prices. It is for this reason that 
the chance of SHAFA experiencing price competition due to this industry 
characteristic is low. 
In addition to price competition, nonprice competition can also affect 
rivalry within an industry, although “competition on dimensions other than price ... 
is less likely to erode profitability because it improves customer value and can 
support higher prices” (Porter, 2008, p. 86). Nonprice competition can “actually 
increase the average profitability of an industry, when each competitor aims to 
serve the needs of different customer segments, with different mixes of price, 
products, services, features, or brand identities” (Porter, 2008, p. 86). 
Competition in the supportive housing industry is mainly nonprice based. While 
there is a wide range of price points for individual supportive housing units, 
usually the ones at the lower end of the spectrum are either publicly subsidized 
or not-for-profit while the price of higher end units are based on the additional 
features and services being offered. While higher end units are able to command 
a considerable premium due to the additional amenities they offer there is not 
one single differentiating factor identifiable as the source of this price premium; 
rather it arises as a result of the combination of factors offered in a particular unit. 
Consequently, there exists an opportunity for a competitor with a significantly 
differentiated and desirable product to achieve a price premium even at the high 
end of the spectrum. 
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3.5.7. Analysis from an Entrant’s Perspective 
Demographics are the dominant factor affecting rivalry among existing 
competitors in the supportive housing industry. As the baby boomers age and 
retire demand for supportive housing industry products and services will increase 
to unprecedented levels. As a result, the influence of industry growth rate will 
rapidly come to dwarf the combined influences of the remaining four factors 
described by Porter as affecting the intensity of rivalry among existing 
competitors, drastically reducing the rivalry within the industry. The relative lack 
of intense rivalry among existing competitors in the supportive housing industry 
due to this unprecedented industry growth rate indicates that now would be an 
ideal opportunity for a new entrant to enter the industry. 
Another characteristic that would make the supportive housing industry 
attractive to a new entrant is the low incidence of price-based competition, which 
is “especially destructive to profitability” (Porter, 2008, p. 85). Due to the current 
characteristics of the supportive housing industry, the four main factors 
contributing to the incidence of price-based competition have minimal effect. As a 
result, the majority of the competition in the supportive housing industry is 
nonprice competition. The prevalence of nonprice competition in the supportive 
housing industry makes the industry especially attractive to new entrants, as 
nonprice competition is less likely to decrease profitability within an industry, 
leaving opportunities for new entrants with differentiated products to enter into 
the industry. Provided SHAFA can offer a sufficiently differentiated product, it 
should find plenty of opportunities in the supportive housing industry. 
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3.6. Summary 
While all of the previously mentioned factors and forces have some effect 
on the competitors within the supportive housing industry, from the perspective of 
a new entrant the price sensitivity of buyers plays the greatest role in determining 
success or failure. Seniors, the main buyers of the supportive housing industry, 
often have limited income and are under pressure to reduce their purchasing 
costs. This, combined with the purchase of a supportive housing residence 
representing a significant proportion of that income, makes them very price 
sensitive. Considering that the alternatives to purchasing a supportive housing 
residence, maintaining homeownership or renovation, involve a comparatively 
minor expense on the senior’s part, it is no surprise that the capture rate of the 
supportive housing industry is only around 10% of the total senior population 
across Canada (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2013b). 
Despite current demographic trends expected to increase the demand for 
supportive housing industry products significantly, the low capture rate combined 
with the high switching costs after the initial purchase explain why new entrants 
in the supportive housing industry must attract new customers in order to 
succeed. In order to attract new customers from an extremely price sensitive 
population, new entrants in the supportive housing industry have to deliver an 
enticing value proposition. Considering the relative similarity of the supportive 
housing options currently available, the ideal method for a new entrant to achieve 
an enticing value proposition is through product differentiation. This is what 
SHAFA hopes to achieve with its universal home concept. 
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4. SHAFA and the Universal Home Concept 
SHAFA believes that its innovative business model utilizing the universal 
home concept makes it an ideal candidate to address the challenges involved in 
entering and operating within the supportive housing industry. This chapter 
explains SHAFA’s universal home concept and the key success factors that will 
enable SHAFA to enter and compete within the supportive housing industry. 
 
Figure 3: A bathroom in a universal home (SHAFA, 2012; personal 
communication). 
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4.1. The Universal Home Concept 
The universal home concept developed by SHAFA is an innovative 
business model that alleviates the necessity for in home care for seniors and 
other individuals with mobility or sensory impairment. The belief underlying the 
universal home concept is simple: by designing a home with an individual’s 
specific needs in mind, it is possible for that individual to remain independent for 
a longer period. Reducing an individual’s reliance on caregivers, either formally 
through a provincial health care institution or informally through family members 
or friends, by providing a home constructed to allow that specific individual to 
maintain their levels of self-sufficiency will reduce that individual’s impact on the 
provincial health care system and ultimately benefit the Canadian taxpayer. 
Additionally, allowing individuals to maintain their independence for as long as 
possible makes the individual feel like less of a burden to their family or 
caregivers, ultimately improving the individual’s outlook on life. 
In summary, the universal home concept as envisioned by SHAFA will 
confer the following benefits to individuals living with mobility or sensory 
impairment: increased independence, reduced reliance on publicly funded 
services, and an increased quality of life. Providing individuals with mobility or 
sensory impairment the environment and tools necessary to enable them to 
maintain their self-reliance and self-sufficiency is the driving vision of the SHAFA 
team and the ultimate goal of the universal home concept. SHAFA believes that 
the universal home concept will provide sufficient product differentiation to give 
SHAFA a competitive advantage in the supportive housing industry. 
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What exactly is a universal home? Simply put, a universal home is a home 
purposefully built in order to be as accommodating as possible to individuals of 
any age or ability initially, with the added ability to facilitate further customization 
as easily as possible depending on any additional needs the individual may 
develop over time. Based on an open concept floor plan created by an architect 
with experience designing condominiums for individuals with disabilities, SHAFA 
designed the universal home to be as appealing to individuals without mobility or 
sensory impairment as it is to individuals who live with these conditions. From 
this basic floor plan, SHAFA incorporated assistive devices and appliances from 
a number of off-the-shelf products designed to be as accommodating as possible 
to people with different disabilities. Finally, SHAFA installed a system of sensors 
and monitoring devices to identify problems and take intelligent actions in order 
to prevent them from escalating into emergencies. 
The sensors and monitoring devices are a key component of a universal 
home, allowing it to be a truly “smart” home, enabling individuals living with 
disabilities to achieve a greater measure of independence and allowing their 
caregivers greater peace of mind in the knowledge that their loved one is safe. 
For example, if appliances such as the stove and refrigerator remain unused, the 
system understands that the individual might not have eaten during that period. 
Alternatively, if the individual enters a room and there is no further movement, 
the system understands that the individual may be in some sort of difficulty. In 
each case, the system would be intelligent enough to alert the appropriate 
responder, whether that is a family member, doctor, or emergency worker. 
 52 
 
Will all of these additional features cause a universal home to be more 
expensive? The short answer is no. Through a thorough analysis, it becomes 
evident that the cost of building a universal home is approximately equal to or in 
some cases less than a regular home. This is largely due to two reasons:  
1. The labour cost is almost identical, as the amount of work a contractor has 
to complete is similar for both homes. 
2. Eliminating the costs of other materials that are not necessary for the 
universal home offsets the additional costs of the specialized appliances.  
For example, SHAFA found a major difference in the price of the construction of 
the bathroom. Currently, bathroom tubs and showers that possess even a slight 
ledge can cause accessibility problems for individuals with impaired mobility. 
Consequently, the universal home incorporates open and waterproofed 
bathrooms, as shown in Figure 3, which are very accessible to people with 
mobility problems. As seen in Figure 3, there is no cabinetry used in the 
construction of the bathroom, decreasing the construction cost due to the 
reduction in the materials used. The savings resulting from the reduction of 
materials used in the construction of the bathroom can then offset any increased 
costs arising from providing additional amenities in other rooms. 
It is for these reasons that SHAFA believes that it can provide new 
universal homes to supportive housing industry customers at prices competitive 
with the prices currently charged by the incumbents. SHAFA also believes that 
the additional features and amenities included in its universal homes will provide 
sufficient differentiation to give SHAFA a competitive advantage in the industry. 
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While the construction of a new supportive housing residence can 
incorporate the design features and amenities required in the universal home 
concept at competitive prices, renovation of an existing residence to incorporate 
the same universal home features and amenities can cost twice as much. The 
main reason for the higher cost is due the doubled labour effort resulting from the 
necessity of removing the original fixtures before the installation of the new 
amenities can proceed. Recycling and disposal of the old material is another 
factor that can contribute to the increased cost. Furthermore, the cost of 
renovation can vary greatly. For instance, if renovation requires the removal of a 
wall that houses plumbing and electrical work, then those professionals need to 
come on the site to re-route their systems. This can substantially complicate the 
construction process and significantly add to the cost.  
Thus, the conclusion was that it is much more cost effective to consider 
building a universal home that is accessible for people with disabilities at the 
original point of construction rather than renovating it later. This will also give 
designers and users much more freedom and flexibility to attain their 
requirements in the housing unit. In addition to the cost considerations making 
the construction of a new supportive housing residence more attractive than 
renovation of an existing residence, supportive housing unit purchasers are also 
more willing to buy a new unit than a renovated one, to the point where they will 
pay a price premium for a new unit. SHAFA believes that the additional features 
and amenities included in its universal homes will provide sufficient differentiation 
to allow SHAFA to charge premium prices for its residences at no increased cost. 
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4.2. SHAFA’s Key Success Factors 
Currently in the Canadian supportive housing market, there is not much to 
differentiate between the products offered by the major providers, with only minor 
differences, such as the presence or absence of a particular amenity such as a 
spa or movie theatre or the ability to own pets, separating residences. 
Consequently, the driving factors for potential residents choosing between 
residences is based more on price and location than any sort of brand loyalty, 
with customers choosing residences with the best value proposition located 
within close proximity to their relatives in the community. An additional 
consequence of this is that the key success factor for the major providers of 
independent and assisted living supportive housing units in Canada, Chartwell 
and Revera, is mostly due to their large size and leading market positions. 
Chartwell and Revera have been able to leverage their leading market positions 
to obtain increased access to capital and top quality leadership and management 
with years of experience in the supportive housing industry. 
As a start-up looking to enter the supportive housing industry, it will be 
very difficult for SHAFA to compete with established companies such as 
Chartwell and Revera on either of these factors, requiring SHAFA to determine 
other key areas to develop its core competencies. Therefore, in order to 
differentiate itself from the current market providers, SHAFA has focused on 
developing product-related and operational success factors either neglected or 
overlooked by the current providers in the industry. 
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The foremost of SHAFA’s key success factors is the technological 
innovation it brings to the supportive housing industry. The modular, upgradable 
design features incorporated into SHAFA’s universal homes, including monitoring 
features that allow residents an unprecedented level of safety and grant their 
relatives supreme peace of mind, offer residents the maximum opportunity to age 
in place while bringing the supportive housing industry into the 21st century. 
SHAFA believes that the supportive housing industry has remained largely 
ignorant of and unexposed to the recent proliferation of biomedical engineering 
technologies and that providing these technologies will enable SHAFA to develop 
and maintain a distinct competitive advantage in the industry. 
Another of SHAFA’s key success factors is its connection to the 
Biomedical Engineering and Gerontology Departments at Simon Fraser 
University, specifically its collaboration with Dr Andrew Rawicz, the founder and 
former chair of the Simon Fraser University’s Biomedical Engineering 
Department. Through collaboration with Dr. Rawicz and others at Simon Fraser 
University, SHAFA as the knowledge and expertise to both rapidly determine the 
technology and equipment necessary to incorporate into a personalized universal 
home design based on an individual’s disability and modify or replace that 
technology as necessary in order to accommodate changes or progression in the 
individual’s disability. This technological expertise will grant a resident an 
unprecedented ability to age in place, severely reducing, if not removing 
altogether, the chance of having to change accommodations because of 
increased disability, which is often a traumatic event. 
  
A final key success factor that also derives from SHAFA’s close 
relationship with the Biomedical Engineering Department at Simon Fraser 
University is SHAFA’s unpreceden
developed within the Biomedical Engineering Department. This connection will 
not only allow SHAFA to remain at the forefront of innovation in the supportive 
housing industry, but also grant the ability to rapidly desi
devices for any individuals whose particular needs cannot be met by devices 
currently on the market. SHAFA’s access to new devices and research as well as 
to some of the best and brightest young talent will be instrumental to SHAFA’s 
continuing success in the future.
 
Figure 4: SHAFA’s key success factors (Author, 2014).
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To summarize, SHAFA’s most important critical success factor is the 
vision of bringing the supportive housing industry into the 21st century through the 
intelligent and customized incorporation of biomedical engineering 
advancements into the home utilizing the universal home concept. SHAFA also 
aims to take advantage of the wealth of knowledge and expertise and the access 
to innovative biomedical engineering research and developments through 
collaboration with the Biomedical Engineering and Gerontology Departments at 
Simon Fraser University. SHAFA believes that technological innovation has 
stagnated within the Canadian supportive housing industry and companies able 
to deliver innovation to the industry will be at a significant advantage to the 
entrenched competition. The cultivation and maintenance of these factors will be 
critical to any success that SHAFA may achieve in developing and maintaining a 
competitive advantage in the Canadian supportive housing industry. 
4.3. Conclusion 
After thorough analysis utilizing Porter’s Five Forces of Competition 
Framework (Porter, 2008), the natural conclusion is that now is an exciting time 
to be in the supportive housing industry in Canada. Yet, in order to succeed in 
the industry, major problems remain, notably the barrier to entry in the form of a 
comparatively large capital requirement and the lack of differentiation between 
competitors in the marketplace. SHAFA believes that its product is sufficiently 
different from those offered by current competitors as to represent a significant 
draw for consumers. The lack of technological innovation in the Canadian 
supportive housing industry has created the perfect opportunity for a competitor 
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such as SHAFA to enter the market offering a technologically superior product 
and create a potential sea change in the way the industry does business. 
If SHAFA can achieve a successful market entry, it believes that it can 
maintain the technological advantage that differentiates it from its competitors 
through its close relationship with the excellent gerontology and biomedical 
engineering research community at Simon Fraser University. SHAFA believes 
that the wealth of knowledge and expertise it has access to through Simon 
Fraser University will enable it to rapidly design and prototype new devices for 
any individuals with conditions not addressed by devices currently on the market. 
SHAFA believes that this proactive product development will enable it to deliver 
continuous innovation to the supportive housing industry. 
SHAFA is offering customized and upgradable homes incorporating the 
latest technological advancements in biomedical engineering, built to maximize 
accessibility for customers with some degree of mobility, sensory, or age related 
impairment. SHAFA’s products will offer customers the unique ability to maintain 
the maximum amount of independence for as long as possible while giving their 
relatives freedom from worrying about their safety. SHAFA believes it can attain 
competitive pricing with respect to competitors’ products, although differentiation 
from competitors’ products indicates the potential for a price premium. SHAFA’s 
product must possess these attributes in addition to the attributes viewed as 
“standard” in the supportive housing industry in order to attain any sort of 
advantage over its competitors. 
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5. SHAFA’s Market Entry Mode 
As SHAFA is a new entrant into the supportive housing industry, the most 
important task it has is to decide on the market entry mode it will adopt in order to 
address the market. The central conflict that SHAFA must resolve in order to 
choose an appropriate entry mode is one of risk versus control, as entry modes 
that allow increasing amounts of control also expose SHAFA to increasing levels 
of risk. In order to make the correct decision about which entry mode to adopt, 
SHAFA must understand the risks and benefits associated with each. 
5.1. Possible Market Entry Alternatives 
As construction market entry shares many similar characteristics with real 
estate development market entry, Chen and Messner’s (2009) taxonomy of ten 
entry mode strategies for international construction markets may be adapted and 
applied to entry into the domestic real estate development market. Of the ten 
entry mode strategies identified by Chen and Messner (2009), representative 
office, local agent, and branch office/company are solely suitable for existing 
companies looking to enter international markets. We may also combine joint 
venture project and sole venture project respectively with joint venture company 
and sole venture company, as the only difference between projects and 
companies is the duration of the association. Table 1 illustrates the results of the 
proposed modifications of Chen and Messner’s (2009) taxonomy. 
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Number Entry Mode 
1 Strategic alliance 
2 Build-Operate-Transfer 
3 Licensing 
4 Joint venture company 
5 Sole venture company 
Table 1: Initial market entry modes for domestic real estate development (Chen 
and Messner, 2009; adapted by author). 
5.1.1. Strategic Alliance 
A strategic alliance can be defined as “a long-term inter-corporate 
association without an affiliated organization based on trust and a mutual respect 
for each participant’s business needs, used to further the common interests of 
the members” (Chen and Messner, 2009, p. 5). As strategic alliances are long-
term business relationships, there is always another entry mode, usually a joint 
venture project or company, used by the partners in the strategic alliance to 
achieve market entry (Chen and Messner, 2009). Partners in a strategic alliance 
share strategies, technology, resources, and profits in order to address their 
collective needs over numerous transactions or projects without the legal 
entanglement involved in the creation of an incorporated subsidiary or formal 
partnership. The shared access to resources allows strategic alliances to reduce 
their members’ exposure to risk while maintaining a rapid response to market 
changes. However, the lack of a formal structure requires a lengthy prior working 
relationship between the alliance partners in order to establish the trust and 
mutual respect necessary to operate within this entry mode.  
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While SHAFA would benefit from the shared resources and experience of 
a strategic alliance, its position as a new entrant in the supportive housing market 
means that it lacks an established business relationship with any potential 
strategic alliance partners. The increased difficulty of finding potential partners for 
a strategic alliance that arises from SHAFA’s lack of an established business 
relationship, combined with the lack of any formal binding legal agreement 
covering the responsibilities of each partner in the strategic alliance, makes a 
strategic alliance a poor choice of entry mode for SHAFA. 
5.1.2. Build-Operate-Transfer 
Build-operate-transfer, also known as a public private partnership, occurs 
when “the government grants a concession to a private sector entity, a bidding 
consortium or project company, and in turn, the concessionaire puts up the 
necessary capital, designs and constructs the infrastructure, and operates it for a 
certain period of time ... in order to pay off the debt and earn a reasonable rate of 
return from the operational revenue. The concessionaire then transfers 
ownership of the infrastructure to the government free of charge or at an agreed 
price” (Chen and Messner, 2009, p. 7).  
While access to complementary governmental skills and resources and 
publicity from working with governmental agencies to achieve a win/win result 
would be beneficial to SHAFA, build-operate-transfer does not help SHAFA 
overcome the financial entry barrier initially preventing it from entering the 
supportive housing market. It is for this reason that build-operate-transfer is not 
the recommended entry mode for SHAFA. 
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5.1.3. Licensing 
Licensing is an entry mode that “involves a contract between parties ... on 
a licensee’s use of limited rights or resources, e.g., patents, trademarks, trade 
names, technology, managerial skills, etc. from a licensor” (Chen and Messner, 
2009, p. 7). In SHAFA’s case, licensing would probably involve providing 
SHAFA’s expertise with modern technology to an existing supportive housing 
provider. While licensing would enable SHAFA to enter the supportive housing 
market without committing the funding required to construct a supportive housing 
residence and to avoid exposure the corresponding construction risks, it is not 
without drawbacks. For instance, “income from licensing can be lower than from 
other modes of direct ... market presence, and ... a ... licensee can also become 
a competitor of the licensor” (Chen and Messner, 2009, p. 7-8). 
While licensing would be a relatively low-cost and low-risk, method for 
SHAFA to enter the supportive housing market, it is not a particularly attractive 
entry method for SHAFA. The primary reason why licensing is not an attractive 
market entry method for SHAFA is because many of the technologies and design 
options SHAFA utilizes in the universal home concept are not proprietary. 
Effectively, SHAFA would be providing expertise in gerontology and biomedical 
engineering that to the licensee, and as a result, there is little preventing the 
licensee from adopting SHAFA’s best practices once the terms of the licensing 
agreement are over. It is for this reason that licensing is not a particularly 
attractive market entry strategy for SHAFA, despite its relatively low-cost and 
low-risk nature. 
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5.1.4. Sole Venture 
Sole ventures are the entry mode of choice for organizations that wish to 
retain the most control over their entry and operation in a new market. 
Companies using sole ventures to enter a new market set up their own 
organization without any material assistance or strategic support from any 
organizations currently operating in the market. 
A sole venture would be the most expeditious entry mode for SHAFA to 
enter into a new market, as it does not encumber SHAFA with the possibly 
lengthy negotiation necessary to secure and maintain the support of other 
organizations. Additionally, operating as a sole venture would allow SHAFA to 
maintain control of its own assets, giving SHAFA the flexibility to address 
organizational issues in whichever method it deems most appropriate. However, 
because of SHAFA’s inexperience and lack of expertise in operating a business 
in the supportive housing industry, operating as a sole venture would expose 
SHAFA to potentially unacceptable levels of risk, up to and including the loss of 
SHAFA’s entire investment. 
5.1.5. Joint Venture 
A joint venture partnership occurs when two organizations collaborate to 
enter a new market a by entering a legally binding joint venture contract or 
agreement to create a third organization that they can use to leverage their 
combined resources and experience to address the new market. Each 
organization in a joint venture also contributes equity to the joint venture and 
ideally brings resources and experience that compliments the resources and 
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experience of their partner in the venture. There are two types of joint venture 
partnerships: integrated and non-integrated (Chen and Messner, 2009). An 
integrated joint venture incorporates staff from both parent organizations and 
profits are shared based on the equity contribution of each parent, whereas in a 
non-integrated joint venture “partners are responsible for planning and executing 
their own portion of work as well as the profit and loss made from their portion of 
the work” (Chen and Messner, 2009, p. 7). Due to the negotiation inherent in the 
creation of a joint venture contract or agreement, joint ventures can be very 
flexible in terms of scope, allowing equity, profits, responsibilities and 
expectations to be clearly assigned to either partner during negotiation, enabling 
each partner to know exactly what to expect from the other during the joint 
venture. Similar to strategic alliances, the shared access to resources and 
experience in a joint venture allow for the flexibility necessary for a rapid 
response to market changes while minimizing risk exposure. One potential 
difficulty is that there is often difficulty finding a compatible Joint Venture partner 
with similar goals and complementary abilities. 
A Joint Venture is another reasonable entry mode option for SHAFA to 
consider, especially if SHAFA is able to find a partner with construction industry 
experience. In exchange for SHAFA providing access to the lucrative supportive 
housing market, such a partner would give SHAFA the necessary expertise in 
building construction and maintenance and help SHAFA gain access to the 
capital necessary to complete the project. 
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5.2. Evaluating the Market Entry Alternatives 
Table 2 illustrates the key attributes provided by each of the five possible 
market entry alternatives available to SHAFA. The key attributes provided by 
SHAFA are knowledge of the supportive housing industry as well as knowledge 
of its markets and customers. What SHAFA is looking for in a potential partner is 
a credible partner in the construction industry with the ability to help SHAFA 
obtain access to capital while retaining some leadership control. Table 2 clearly 
shows that three of the five possible market entry alternatives available to 
SHAFA do not provide all of these key attributes SHAFA is looking for, while only 
two, strategic alliances and joint ventures, can provide SHAFA with all of the key 
attributes it is looking for in a partner.  
 
Key Attributes 
Strategic 
Alliance 
Build-
Operate-
Transfer 
Licensing 
Joint 
Venture 
Sole 
Venture 
Customer Knowledge* X X X X X 
Market Knowledge* X X X X X 
Industry Knowledge: 
Supportive Housing* 
X X X X X 
Industry Knowledge: 
Construction 
X   X  
Leadership Control X X  X X 
Access to Capital X   X  
Credible Partner X X X X  
Table 2: Key attributes possessed by market entry alternatives. A * denotes 
key attributes provided by SHAFA (Author, 2014). 
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Working together with the government in a build-operate-transfer 
arrangement to address the potential supportive housing crisis caused by the 
aging population would provide SHAFA with a credible partner while still allowing 
SHAFA to maintain leadership control. However, a build-operate-transfer 
arrangement does not provide SHAFA with access to either the construction 
expertise or the capital necessary to construct a supportive housing facility. 
Alternatively, licensing SHAFA’s technology and expertise to currently 
operating supportive housing companies does not require SHAFA to invest in the 
construction of a supportive housing residence, making licensing a low-cost and 
low-risk option for SHAFA. However, licensing is not particularly attractive as 
SHAFA has little control over the companies using the technology, and there is 
nothing forcing the companies licensing the technology from SHAFA to continue 
once the initial licensing period is over. Licensing SHAFA’s technology and 
expertise brings very little long-term benefit to SHAFA in a best-case scenario 
and only creates potential competitors in a worst-case scenario. 
Even though it presents a high level of risk, the Sole Venture Option is a 
reasonable entry mode because it provides SHAFA with the greatest amount of 
control over its development intentions. SHAFA would be able to control its 
management and project processes. However, this entry mode poses some 
hardship to SHAFA at the outset of market entry and general project initiation. 
The absence of construction experience, a solid reputation, and limited, if any, 
lender or industry relationships will likely slow development activities and add 
costs for the first couple of projects. 
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The two remaining market entry options that offer SHAFA access to its 
desired key attributes in a market entry partner are strategic alliances and joint 
ventures. While a strategic alliance with an appropriate market entry partner 
would allow SHAFA to access the construction industry knowledge, credibility, 
and capital necessary to finance and construct a supportive housing residence, a 
strategic alliance is not necessarily the ideal choice for SHAFA. The primary 
reason why a strategic alliance is not the ideal market entry choice for SHAFA is 
due to the lengthy working relationship between two strategic alliance partners 
that is required in order to achieve a successful strategic alliance where each 
partner has intimate knowledge of and implicitly trusts the other. As SHAFA is a 
new company, by definition it lacks the lengthy working relationship required to 
initiate a strategic alliance with any company, let alone a potential partner. 
The sole remaining market entry option that offers SHAFA access to its 
desired key attributes in a market entry partner is a joint venture. If SHAFA is 
able to find an ideal joint venture partner for its market entry, one which will 
enable SHAFA to access the construction industry knowledge, credibility, and 
capital necessary to finance and construct a supportive housing residence, then 
entering the supportive housing market would be made much simpler than if 
SHAFA were to attempt a sole venture market entry. A joint venture market entry 
with an appropriate partner significantly expands SHAFA’s capabilities and 
reduces the SHAFA’s risk exposure when compared to a sole venture market 
entry. Additionally, a successful joint venture often provides the strong business 
relationship foundation for a potential future strategic alliance. 
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5.3. SHAFA’s Entry Mode Recommendations 
The most appealing entry mode at this stage of evaluation is a joint 
venture partnership. This option provides SHAFA with the complete set of 
success criteria for a strong market start assuming the partners will have 
organizational compatibility. The creation of a joint venture partnership for 
individual projects is an attractive entry strategy for SHAFA. The partner best 
suited would be one with construction experience and existing professional, 
labour, material and lender relationships or alliances enabling it to carry out 
development projects within established periods and at affordable prices. This 
option provides SHAFA with balanced risk and control in as much as its 
investment is equal to that of its partner. The partner in this case can also 
provide the internal success factors SHAFA is lacking, allowing SHAFA to benefit 
and learn from the partner in terms of developing credibility, establishing industry 
relationships and undertaking construction activity. 
Strategic alliances, build-operate-transfer, and licensing are not ideal 
alternatives for SHAFA’s market entry. They are either unattainable due to 
SHAFA’s lack of reputation; don’t provide the required access to capital; or offer 
too much to potential competitors for not enough benefit in return. Although 
potentially providing a number of success factors which SHAFA on its own does 
not have, these options are not recommended for SHAFA’s market entry. Despite 
lacking some of the key attributes entering the market as a sole venture remains 
a risky but achievable prospect, provided that SHAFA is able to obtain access to 
sufficient capital to contract a firm to construct a supportive housing residence. 
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Once SHAFA has made a decision as to which type of company structure 
it will utilize in order to enter the market it must then decide which supportive 
housing market segment it will enter. As this paper has already elucidated the 
differences between the three supportive housing market segments in chapter 2, 
this chapter will deal solely with the recommended supportive housing market 
segment for SHAFA to target: the independent living market. 
The independent living segment of the supportive housing market is the 
ideal segment for SHAFA to target. Supportive housing residences within the 
independent living segment have to the lowest investment costs for seniors, at 
rates comparable to owning an apartment, and offer the highest profit margins for 
the property manager. These attributes can allow SHAFA to offer value to 
seniors while still generating revenue, allowing it to reach maximum occupancy 
and profitability quickly, both of which are important considerations for a new 
entrant into the market. Additionally, the minimal health requirements of the 
seniors within the independent living segment provide two benefits to SHAFA: 
1. Governmental regulations regarding the operation of independent living 
residences are minimal compared to the other segments, as seniors living 
in independent living residences are generally healthier and require 
minimal in-home medical care. 
2. The minimal in-home medical care required by the seniors in independent 
living residences requires a minimal investment by SHAFA in support 
services such as nursing and clinical staff. 
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The minimal government regulation and minimal investment in support 
services also make the independent living segment the most attractive market 
segment for SHAFA as both of these factors significantly reduce the barriers to 
entry for residences targeting the independent living segment compared to the 
other segments of the supportive housing market. The comparatively low barrier 
to entry combined with the comparatively high profitability make the independent 
living segment the most attractive segment for new entrants into the supportive 
housing market such as SHAFA. 
It may be wise, however, for SHAFA to invest in developing capabilities to 
serve the assisted living segment as, given enough time, many seniors will 
progress from independent living to requiring assisted living accommodations of 
some sort. By investing in developing capabilities to serve the assisted living 
segment, such as access to in-home nursing and support services and staff as 
well as an on-site clinic, SHAFA could provide even greater ability for seniors to 
age in place, removing the necessity of a potentially traumatic move to a different 
residence for seniors whose health worsens while in residence. 
By providing independent living residences equipped with the latest 
technologies and expertly designed to offer the maximum opportunity for 
residents to age in place SHAFA could easily distinguish itself from the 
supportive housing providers currently operating. If SHAFA delivers on its 
operational metrics of quality service, excellent value, and maximum opportunity 
to age in place, this potential for brand recognition could easily allow it to become 
the supportive housing provider of choice in the Canadian market. 
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5.4. Exit Strategy Options for a Joint Venture 
As with any other venture, SHAFA must ensure that it has an appropriate 
exit strategy. Exiting from a joint venture can be an especially complicated and 
difficult process as there are often disagreements about the value of the equity 
contributed to the joint venture by each party as well as disagreements over the 
present value of the venture itself. Due to these difficulties, it is often necessary 
to incorporate methods for dissolving the joint venture into the joint venture 
agreement in order to provide a mutually acceptable outcome should the 
relationship between the joint venture partners begin to sour. 
One available option is to have a neutral third party appraiser estimate the 
fair market value of the business first. Then have the partner who wishes to leave 
the partnership decide whether they want to buy the other partner’s share at an 
agreed upon premium or sell their share to the other partner at an equivalent 
discount (Lee, 2010). This method of dissolving the joint venture partnership 
ensures that the fair market value of the business is determined and provides an 
incentive for each partner to remain in the partnership. 
An additional exit option is to allow either partner to leave the venture 
without penalty after an agreed upon period of time, provided that they are able 
to find another party willing to purchase their equity in the joint venture 
partnership and is also an acceptable alternative partner for the partner 
remaining in the joint venture partnership (Lee, 2010). This option allows either 
party the possibility of cashing in their investment in the partnership without 
angering the other partner. 
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6. Marketing to Seniors 
Despite all of the advantages of SHAFA’s universal home concept, a 
marketing plan is still required in order to inform users of these benefits. Although 
supportive housing is not exclusively for seniors, seniors nevertheless make up 
the majority of supportive housing users and are therefore the key demographic 
to target when designing SHAFA’s marketing materials. However, it can be 
difficult to market to seniors effectively. This section examines exactly why 
marketing to seniors is difficult and what can be done to market effectively to 
seniors. It also provides recommendations for a marketing strategy for SHAFA. 
6.1. The Difficulty with Marketing to Seniors 
Marketing to seniors can be difficult. Anyone who watched television in 
1989 probably remembers the phrase “I’ve fallen and I can’t get up!” from 
Lifecall’s advertisements for their emergency medical response service 
(hauntedgeorge, 2007). Despite having a commercial identified by USA Today in 
2007 as the most memorable commercial from the past 25 years (USA Today, 
2007) (incorrectly identified as Life Alert in the article due to Life Alert 
trademarking a similar phrase “Help, I've fallen and I can’t get up!” in 2002 
(United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2013) after Lifecall’s original 
trademark on “I’ve fallen and I can’t get up!” expired in 1999 (United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, 1999)), Lifecall was ultimately a failure, going out 
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of business in 1993 (Fashingbauer Cooper and Bellmont, 2013). Lifecall’s failure 
was largely due to their commercial and product highlighting seniors’ incapability; 
perhaps the most important subject to avoid when marketing to seniors. 
A similar lesson was learned by Heinz following their release of “senior 
food” in 1955 after discovering that substantial quantities of Gerber baby food 
was purchased by seniors with difficulty chewing (Bradley and Longino, 2001). 
“Senior food” was a failure for Heinz as they failed to realize that “older people 
were comfortable buying baby food because anyone observing their purchase in 
the store could conclude the food was intended for a grandchild. However, the 
senior foods held less fascination for mature consumers because these products 
symbolized frailty and helplessness” (Bradley and Longino, 2001, p. 19). 
6.2. How to Market Effectively to Seniors 
As with all marketing campaigns, there are three important variables to 
consider: the target, the message, and the method. This section examines each 
of these three variables to determine an effective marketing strategy for SHAFA. 
6.2.1. Determining the Target Market 
The idea that groups, or decision making units, rather than individuals are 
responsible for making buying decisions (Farris, Robinson, and Wind, 1967) is 
valuable for determining the target of a marketing campaign. According to the 
decision making unit theory of buying decisions, the decision making unit is 
divided into five roles: initiator, influencer, decider, buyer, and user (Farris et al., 
1967). The initiator is the term for the individual or group who identifies the 
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problem that needs to be overcome (Farris et al., 1967). In this case, the initiator 
is most likely a senior noticing that they are having difficulty caring for themselves 
and need assistance with one or more activities of daily life, but the initiator may 
also be a friend or relative of a senior such as the adult child of a senior. The 
influencer is the individual or group that does not make the final decision, but has 
considerable influence over the outcome (Farris et al., 1967). In this case, the 
influencer is often a friend or relative of a senior, perhaps the initiator, who is able 
to convince the senior that they may require some assistance. The decider is the 
individual or group that makes the final purchasing decision (Farris et al., 1967). 
In this case, the decider is also the buyer, the individual or group that carries out 
the negotiation and buying process, usually either the senior or an adult child of 
the senior. Finally, the user is the individual or group using the product or service 
(Farris et al., 1967), which in this case is the senior requiring assistance with 
activities of daily living. Based on these answers, SHAFA’s marketing strategy 
should target seniors and their adult children. 
6.2.2. Determining the Marketing Message 
David B. Wolfe claims that older consumers possess a subjective mindset 
that is predicated by “internal behavior cues”, especially when compared to the 
objective mindset predicated by “external behavior cues” such as “peer group 
values and social expectations” exhibited by younger consumers (Wolfe, 1992, p. 
15). Wolfe explains that a root cause of the problems faced by marketing 
managers today of “declining brand loyalty and decreased effectiveness of 
advertising” is a direct result of the demographic shift towards an older society 
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and the corresponding shift to a subjective mindset (Wolfe, 1992, p. 15). Wolfe 
contends that in order to effectively market to older consumers the message 
must address five key values: autonomy, social connectedness, altruism, 
personal growth, and revitalization, using “ambiguous symbols” that are 
“suggestive rather than absolute in meaning” that “allow a broad range of 
interpretations” (Wolfe, 1992, p. 17-18). With this in mind, SHAFA’s marketing 
message should focus on how its product facilitates autonomy, allowing for a 
greater social connection with both family and the community while offering 
opportunities for revitalization and personal growth.  
6.2.3. Determining the Marketing Method 
Choosing a method to reach seniors can also be a significant obstacle. 
Barbara Risto, Publisher at Senior Living Magazine, claims that research 
indicates that a combination of print and online information provides more return 
on investment than focusing on one or the other. This is because despite seniors 
being the fastest growing demographic of internet users they still represent a 
small percentage of the total, so “magazines will still remain their first choice for 
casual, enjoyable reading” (Risto, 2012). Risto recommends emphasizing service 
and trust and offering value through deals or complementary services when 
communicating with seniors and reminds that word of mouth can be a powerful 
tool in convincing seniors to choose your product or service (Risto, 2012). Based 
on this information, SHAFA should focus on a print and internet marketing 
campaign, while offering value through complementary services. 
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6.3. Recommendations for SHAFA’s Marketing Strategy 
Considering Risto’s recommendations about the method of 
communication and the target decision making unit, SHAFA’s marketing media 
should consist of a print advertising campaign targeting local newspapers and 
magazines with high readership by seniors and their adult children alongside a 
complementary website. Considering Wolfe’s advice about the message, both 
should focus on how universal homes facilitate autonomy, allowing for a greater 
social connection with both family and the community while offering opportunities 
for revitalization and personal growth. SHAFA must then establish and maintain a 
reputation for quality and customer service in order to obtain good word of mouth 
advertising, which is often the key to penetrating the senior market. In terms of 
deals and complementary services to enhance the value of SHAFA’s product, 
one potential strategy would be to offer free trial accommodations with 
complementary moving assistance, similar to that offered by Concert’s Tapestry 
Senior’s Living Communities (Concert, 2014). Providing these services would 
allow SHAFA to demonstrate the quality of life benefits of living in a universal 
home while simultaneously increasing customer willingness to move by reducing 
or eliminating the stress and hassle that moving represents. Additionally, 
providing customer testimonial in both print and online advertising would be 
helpful in convincing seniors they are making a good decision in choosing to live 
in a universal home. By focusing on respectful advertising, excellent customer 
service, and a quality value proposition, SHAFA should have no difficulty 
attracting residents to their universal homes. 
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7. Financial Projections 
According to Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation estimates for 
British Columbia’s Lower Mainland, a region comprised of the Vancouver and 
Abbotsford-Mission Census Metropolitan Areas and the Chilliwack and Squamish 
Census Agglomerations, vacancy rates for independent living supportive housing 
facilities have decreased from 13.7% in 2012 to 12.1% in 2013 (Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2013a). This decrease is surprising, 
considering that there was a 3% increase in the number of independent living 
supportive housing spaces (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2012, 
2013a). This indicates that the increased demand for supportive housing due to 
the increase in the senior population is already beginning to appear. Additionally, 
the average monthly rent for an independent living suite in the Lower Mainland 
increased by almost 4% to $2,998 in 2013 from $2,888 in 2012 (Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2012, 2013a). The fact that rents rose 
despite the additional supply is another indicator of the strong demand for 
supportive housing in the Lower Mainland. 
Additionally, 68.5% of the independent living suites available in the Lower 
Mainland command an average monthly rent in excess of $2,400, with 45% 
having an average monthly rent in excess of $2,900 (Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation, 2013a). Intriguingly, the vacancy rate decreases as rent 
increases, with independent living suites in the Lower Mainland with an average 
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monthly rent in excess of $2,900 having a vacancy rate of only 10.7% (Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2013a). Based on this fact, and the fact that 
the rent for a recently built high-end one bedroom independent living suite is 
$4,900 per month (Comfort Life, 2013) SHAFA should set their rental rates at 
around $5,000 per month. 
 
 
Table 3: Development cost estimate for the SHAFA project (Author, 2014). 
In order to give SHAFA a rough idea of the cost commitment it must 
assume if it wishes to undertake building an independent living supportive 
housing facility the above developmental cost estimate was prepared. The 
assumptions used to create the developmental cost estimate included that the 
Development Cost Estimate Source
Land Costs
Acquisition 1,295,000$   (Remax, 2014)
Property Transfer Tax 23,900$        (Province of British Columbia, 2014b)
Building Permit Fees 56,580$        (City of Vancouver, 2014a)
Subtotal 1,375,480$   
Professional Fees
Planning/Architecture 640,000$      (Reed Construction Data, 2013)
Environmental Assessment 75,000$        (Port Metro Vancouver, 2011)
Subtotal 715,000$      
Construction Costs
Facility Design and Construction 6,400,000$   (Reed Construction Data, 2013)
Contractor Fees 1,600,000$   (Reed Construction Data, 2013)
Construction Contingency 800,000$      
Subtotal 8,800,000$   
Taxes 1,141,800$   (Worrall, 2013)
Total Development Costs 12,032,280$ 
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building would be a two-storey apartment complex containing 100 suites, each 
approximately 750 square feet in size for a total footprint of approximately 40,000 
square feet. The land costs were determined based on the price of an 
approximately 18.4 acre lot in Langley (Remax, 2014), a city located in the 
Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area (Statistics Canada, 2011), although land 
prices are highly variable across the region. The building permit fees were 
determined based on the rates for Vancouver (City of Vancouver, 2014a) and the 
estimate for the environmental assessment fees came from approximate rates 
from the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority (Port Metro Vancouver, 2011). The 
estimates for the cost per square foot of construction and planning, architecture, 
and contracting fees come from estimates from Reed Construction Data (Reed 
Construction Data, 2013). A construction contingency of 10% of estimated 
construction costs was added to compensate for potential cost overruns and the 
taxes were assumed to be 5% Goods and Services Tax and 7% Provincial Sales 
Tax applied to professional fees and construction costs (Worrall, 2013). 
If SHAFA is able to find an acceptable joint venture partner, it can begin to 
consider the options available for financing the project. Assuming a 50-50 joint 
venture SHAFA will have to provide nearly $6,000,000 for the construction of the 
project. As SHAFA is a start-up company, it will have to obtain a considerable 
amount of debt financing in order to provide this. Assuming SHAFA obtains a $6 
million mortgage at a 4% interest rate (Royal Bank of Canada, 2014) over a 25-
year amortization period its monthly mortgage payments would be $31,670. 
Table 4 indicates the net income for the venture, assuming that rental rates are 
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at $5,000 per unit, the facility reaches 90% capacity in year 2, operating costs 
are 45% of revenue (Baybridge Seniors Housing, 2012), the buildings depreciate 
at 4% per year (Canada Revenue Agency, 2014b) and rents increase by 
approximately 4% per year (Province of British Columbia, 2014a). Tax rates were 
determined based on rates posted by the Canada Revenue Agency (Canada 
Revenue Agency, 2014a, 2014c) and the City of Vancouver (City of Vancouver, 
2014b). The estimate assumed a 2% rate of inflation (Bank of Canada, 2012). 
Assuming that SHAFA is able to find a 50-50 joint venture partner and therefore 
is entitled to 50% of the profit, the venture will start to become profitable for 
SHAFA in year 1. Table 4 illustrates a simplified financial review for SHAFA for 
each of the first 5 years of its operation. 
 
 
Table 4: Selected financial information for SHAFA’s first 5 years of operation 
(Author, 2014). 
 
Financial Information
1 2 3 4 5
Growth Rate 2% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Gross Rental Revenue 6,000,000$      6,240,000$      6,489,600$      6,749,184$      7,019,151$      
Vacancy Rate 50% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Gross Effective Income 3,000,000$      5,616,000$      5,840,640$      6,074,266$      6,317,236$      
Operating Expenses 1,650,000-$      3,369,600-$      3,504,384-$      3,644,559-$      3,790,342-$      
EBITDA 1,350,000$      2,246,400$      2,336,256$      2,429,706$      2,526,894$      
Depreciation 320,000-$         320,000-$         320,000-$         320,000-$         320,000-$         
Net Operating Income 1,030,000$      1,926,400$      2,016,256$      2,109,706$      2,206,894$      
Mortgage Payments 760,085-$         760,085-$         760,085-$         760,085-$         760,085-$         
Federal Income Tax 40,487-$           174,947-$         188,426-$         202,443-$         217,021-$         
Provincial Income Tax 6,748-$             85,795-$           95,679-$           105,958-$         116,649-$         
Property Tax 14,272-$           14,272-$           14,272-$           14,272-$           14,272-$           
Net Income 208,408$         891,301$         957,795$         1,026,948$      1,098,867$      
SHAFA Net Income 104,204$         445,651$         478,897$         513,474$         549,434$         
Year
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While the financial estimates provided in this section are as accurate as 
can be provided given the preliminary stage of this proposal, it is unfortunately 
subject to additional risk due to the preliminary nature of the information utilized 
for its construction. The key factors affecting the outcome of the estimates are 
the development cost, operating expenses, growth rate as these estimates will 
vary depending on a number of influencing factors and can affect multiple values 
used in the estimates. Table 5 provides a sensitivity analysis showing possible 
variations within these key factors. 
 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis for key factors affecting financial estimates 
(Author, 2014).  
Table 5 shows that in a pessimistic scenario SHAFA will not be profitable 
in its first year of operation. As a result, SHAFA must remain vigilant to ensure 
that it controls the development costs for its construction project as well as its 
operating expenses. SHAFA should also ensure that it has a large enough 
contingency fund to compensate for any shortfalls it might experience during its 
first year of operations. If SHAFA can control its costs and survive its first year of 
operation, the effects of the growth rate of the senior population on increasing the 
demand for supportive housing indicates that it should have little difficulty 
reaching profitability. 
Influencing Factor Sensitivity Optimistic Base Pessimistic
Development Cost +/- 25% $9,024,210 $12,032,280 $15,040,350
Operating Expenses +/- 5% 50% 55% 60%
Growth Rate +/- 2% 6% 4% 2%
SHAFA Net Income Year 1 $244,463 $104,204 -$36,055
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8. Conclusion 
The purpose of this project was to explore market conditions in the 
supportive housing market in Canada, with a specific focus in British Columbia, in 
order to develop an effective entry strategy for SHAFA. An analysis of the 
demographic factors affecting demand within the senior housing industry was 
completed, along with a competitor analysis and an industry analysis utilizing 
Porter’s Five Forces of Competition Framework. Additionally, SHAFA’s key 
success factors were determined and possible entry modes and marketing 
strategies were outlined. Finally, a preliminary financial estimate was created. 
The combined results of these analyses indicate that now is an 
opportunistic time for SHAFA to enter into the supportive housing market. The 
retirement and senescence of the baby boomer generation have created a 
demand for supportive housing that will only increase in the coming years. With 
an intelligent marketing strategy that emphasizes their key success factors of 
access to and expertise with advanced biomedical engineering technology 
SHAFA can potentially differentiate itself from its competitors enough to provide it 
with a significant competitive advantage. Choosing an appropriate joint venture 
partner will assist SHAFA in managing the risks and financial difficulty that 
forming any new company entails and their expertise will be essential to 
SHAFA’s success in entering the supportive housing industry. 
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